

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
11 June 2009

Original: English

**France, Japan, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America:
draft resolution**

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004), resolution 1695 (2006), and, in particular, resolution 1718 (2006), as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41) and 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7),

Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Expressing the gravest concern at the nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("the DPRK") on 25 May 2009 (local time) in violation of resolution 1718 (2006), and at the challenge such a test constitutes to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ("the NPT") and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons towards the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and the danger it poses to peace and stability in the region and beyond,

Stressing its collective support for the NPT and commitment to strengthen the Treaty in all its aspects, and global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, and *recalling* that the DPRK cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon state in accordance with the NPT in any case,

Deploing the DPRK's announcement of withdrawal from the NPT and its pursuit of nuclear weapons,

Underlining once again the importance that the DPRK respond to other security and humanitarian concerns of the international community,

Underlining also that measures imposed by this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK,

Expressing its gravest concern that the nuclear test and missile activities carried out by the DPRK have further generated increased tension in the region and beyond, and *determining* that there continues to exist a clear threat to international peace and security,



Reaffirming the importance that all Member States uphold the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,

1. *Condemns* in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 25 May 2009 (local time) in violation and flagrant disregard of its relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 1695 (2006) and 1718 (2006), and the statement of its President of 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7);

2. *Demands* that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or any launch using ballistic missile technology;

3. *Decides* that the DPRK shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches;

4. *Demands* that the DPRK immediately comply fully with its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 1718 (2006);

5. *Demands* that the DPRK immediately retract its announcement of withdrawal from the NPT;

6. *Demands* further that the DPRK return at an early date to the NPT and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, bearing in mind the rights and obligations of States Parties to the NPT, and *underlines* the need for all States Parties to the NPT to continue to comply with their Treaty obligations;

7. *Calls upon* all Member States to implement their obligations pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), including with respect to designations made by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) ("the Committee") pursuant to the statement of its President of 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7);

8. *Decides* that the DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and immediately cease all related activities, shall act strictly in accordance with the obligations applicable to parties under the NPT and the terms and conditions of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement (IAEA INFCIRC/403) and shall provide the IAEA transparency measures extending beyond these requirements, including such access to individuals, documentation, equipment and facilities as may be required and deemed necessary by the IAEA;

9. *Decides* that the measures in paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to all arms and related materiel, as well as to financial transactions, technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms or materiel;

10. *Decides* that the measures in paragraph 8 (a) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to all arms and related materiel, as well as to financial transactions, technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms, except for small arms and light weapons and their related materiel, and *calls upon* States to exercise vigilance over the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK of small arms or light weapons, and further *decides* that States shall notify the Committee at least five

days prior to selling, supplying or transferring small arms or light weapons to the DPRK;

11. *Calls upon* all States to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, all cargo to and from the DPRK, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b), or 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) or by paragraph 9 or 10 of this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

12. *Calls upon* all Member States to inspect vessels, with the consent of the flag State, on the high seas, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo of such vessels contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b), or 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) or by paragraph 9 or 10 of this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

13. *Calls upon* all States to cooperate with inspections pursuant to paragraphs 11 and 12, and, if the flag State does not consent to inspection on the high seas, *decides* that the flag State shall direct the vessel to proceed to an appropriate and convenient port for the required inspection by the local authorities pursuant to paragraph 11;

14. *Decides* to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, seize and dispose of items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b), or 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) or by paragraph 9 or 10 of this resolution that are identified in inspections pursuant to paragraph 11, 12, or 13 in a manner that is not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties to the NPT, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction of 29 April 1997, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 10 April 1972, and *decides* further that all States shall cooperate in such efforts;

15. *Requires* any Member State, when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraph 11, 12, or 13, or seizes and disposes of cargo pursuant to paragraph 14, to submit promptly reports containing relevant details to the Committee on the inspection, seizure and disposal;

16. *Requires* any Member State, when it does not receive the cooperation of a flag State pursuant to paragraph 12 or 13 to submit promptly to the Committee a report containing relevant details;

17. *Decides* that Member States shall prohibit the provision by their nationals or from their territory of bunkering services, such as provision of fuel or supplies, or other servicing of vessels, to DPRK vessels if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe they are carrying items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b), or 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) or by paragraph 9 or 10 of this resolution, unless provision of such services is necessary for humanitarian purposes or until such time as the cargo has been

inspected, and seized and disposed of if necessary, and *underlines* that this paragraph is not intended to affect legal economic activities;

18. *Calls upon* Member States, in addition to implementing their obligations pursuant to paragraphs 8 (d) and (e) of resolution 1718 (2006), to prevent the provision of financial services or the transfer to, through, or from their territory, or to or by their nationals or entities organized under their laws (including branches abroad), or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources that could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related, or other weapons of mass destruction-related programs or activities, including by freezing any financial or other assets or resources on their territories or that hereafter come within their territories, or that are subject to their jurisdiction or that hereafter become subject to their jurisdiction, that are associated with such programs or activities and applying enhanced monitoring to prevent all such transactions in accordance with their national authorities and legislation;

19. *Calls upon* all Member States and international financial and credit institutions not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, or concessional loans to the DPRK, except for humanitarian and developmental purposes directly addressing the needs of the civilian population, or the promotion of denuclearization, and also *calls upon* States to exercise enhanced vigilance with a view to reducing current commitments;

20. *Calls upon* all Member States not to provide public financial support for trade with the DPRK (including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance to their nationals or entities involved in such trade) where such financial support could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related or ballistic missile-related or other WMD-related programs or activities;

21. *Emphasizes* that all Member States should comply with the provisions of paragraphs 8 (a) (iii) and 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) without prejudice to the activities of the diplomatic missions in the DPRK pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;

22. *Calls upon* all Member States to report to the Security Council within forty-five days of the adoption of this resolution and thereafter upon request by the Committee on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) as well as paragraphs 9 and 10 of this resolution, as well as financial measures set out in paragraphs 18, 19 and 20 of this resolution;

23. *Decides* that the measures set out at paragraphs 8 (a), 8 (b) and 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the items listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1a and INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2a;

24. *Decides* to adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) and this resolution, including through the designation of entities, goods, and individuals, and directs the Committee to undertake its tasks to this effect and to report to the Security Council within thirty days of adoption of this resolution, and further *decides* that, if the Committee has not acted, then the Security Council will complete action to adjust the measures within seven days of receiving that report;

25. *Decides* that the Committee shall intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation of resolution 1718 (2006), the statement of its President of 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7) and this resolution, through a work programme covering compliance, investigations, outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation, to be submitted to the Council by 15 July 2009, and that it shall also receive and consider reports from Member States pursuant to paragraphs 10, 15, 16 and 22 of this resolution;

26. *Requests* the Secretary-General to create for an initial period of one year, in consultation with the Committee, a group of up to seven experts ("Panel of Experts"), acting under the direction of the Committee to carry out the following tasks: (a) assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in resolution 1718 (2006) and the functions specified in paragraph 25 of this resolution; (b) gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures imposed in resolution 1718 (2006) and in this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance; (c) make recommendations on actions the Council, or the Committee or Member States, may consider to improve implementation of the measures imposed in resolution 1718 (2006) and in this resolution; and (d) provide an interim report on its work to the Council no later than 90 days after adoption of this resolution, and a final report to the Council no later than 30 days prior to termination of its mandate with its findings and recommendations;

27. *Urges* all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures imposed by resolution 1718 (2006) and this resolution;

28. *Calls upon* all Member States to exercise vigilance and prevent specialized teaching or training of DPRK nationals within their territories or by their nationals, of disciplines which could contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

29. *Calls upon* the DPRK to join the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the earliest date;

30. *Supports* peaceful dialogue, *calls upon* the DPRK to return immediately to the Six-Party Talks without precondition, and *urges* all the participants to intensify their efforts on the full and expeditious implementation of the Joint Statement issued on 19 September 2005 and the joint documents of 13 February 2007 and 3 October 2007, by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States, with a view to achieving the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia;

31. *Expresses* its commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation and welcomes efforts by Council members as well as other Member States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue and to refrain from any actions that might aggravate tensions;

32. *Affirms* that it shall keep the DPRK's actions under continuous review and that it shall be prepared to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) and relevant paragraphs of this resolution,

including the strengthening, modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed at that time in light of the DPRK's compliance with relevant provisions of resolution 1718 (2006) and this resolution;

33. *Underlines* that further decisions will be required, should additional measures be necessary;

34. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.



Security Council

Distr.: General
10 June 2009

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in that country

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 1233 (1999), by which the Council requested me to keep it regularly informed and to submit a report on developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS). Subsequently, in paragraph 11 of its resolution 1580 (2004), the Council requested me to submit a written report to it every three months.

2. The report focuses on developments since my previous report, dated 31 March 2009 (S/2009/169), in particular the political and military crisis that followed the assassinations of the Head of State and the Chief of the General Staff and the preparations for the presidential elections to be held on 28 June. The report also includes recommendations for an integrated peacebuilding office in Guinea-Bissau and its proposed mandate, structure and staffing requirements, as requested by the Security Council in a letter dated 22 December 2008.

II. Political developments

3. The period under review was characterized by significant political tensions that had an impact on the smooth functioning of State institutions. The apparent calm that followed the assassinations of President João Bernardo Vieira and the Chief of the General Staff, General Tagme Na Waie, in March 2009, was disrupted on 4 June, when the Minister of Territorial Administration and candidate in the presidential elections, Baciro Dabo, was killed by armed men in military uniform early in the day at his residence. Another leading parliamentarian from the ruling African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) was killed with his driver and bodyguard in a car ambush at approximately the same time. According to the State intelligence services, both were allegedly resisting arrest and, together with eight other people, including four members of Parliament, were accused of involvement in a coup attempt. Those assassinations were unanimously condemned by the international community, including the Security Council, my Representative in Guinea-Bissau, the Economic Community of West African States



(ECOWAS), the African Union, the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP) and the European Union. On 9 June, interim President Raimundo Pereira, who was outside of Guinea-Bissau when the two senior officials were killed, confirmed that presidential elections would be held on 28 June, after having consulted with the Government, political parties and the National Electoral Commission.

4. Following the unfortunate events of March 2009, there was a high risk of a constitutional crisis over conflicting provisions regarding the organization of presidential elections: the Constitution provides for a 60-day term of office of an interim President before elections are held, while the Electoral Law envisages a longer time frame for the holding of elections. Interim President Pereira held extensive consultations with parliamentary and other political parties, as well as with members of civil society, to avert a constitutional crisis and secure a consensual solution on the period of his mandate. The intention was to establish an election date that would enable the State to function and respect the spirit of the Constitution before full constitutional order is restored through presidential elections.

5. A memorandum of understanding signed on 31 March by the interim Speaker, the Prime Minister and two parliamentary parties, PAIGC and the Social Renewal Party (PRS), acknowledged that the Constitution severely limited the scope of the interim President, leading to a virtual paralysis of the Government and Parliament. The memorandum of understanding stated that a legal and constitutional solution was not possible and proposed a political solution involving suspending the limitations imposed by the Constitution while retaining those preventing the interim President from dissolving the National Assembly or dismissing the Government. It also extended the mandate of the interim President to 120 days. Interim President Pereira issued a decree on 31 March setting 28 June 2009 as the date for the elections.

6. On 14 March, the Council of Ministers nominated Navy Commander José Zamora Induta, the spokesperson of the Commission of Military Chiefs set up on 1 March after the assassination of the Chief of the General Staff, General Tagme Na Waie, as the new Chief of the General Staff, and Colonel António N'djai, Commander of the Northern Military Command, as the Vice-Chief. The nominations were sent to the interim President for promulgation.

7. On 6 April, João Bernardo de Miranda, former Minister of External Relations of Angola, was appointed as the African Union Special Envoy for Guinea-Bissau. He visited Bissau from 21 to 26 April.

8. Twenty-one political parties not represented in Parliament issued a communiqué on 2 April condemning what they termed "the drift from the rule of law in the country". The communiqué stated that the Government had shown its incapacity to take charge and called upon it to resign. It urged the National Assembly to hold a debate on the situation in the country and warned the international community that the deteriorating situation threatened the institutions of the State.

9. On 4 April, the interim President issued a presidential decree confirming the appointments of Commander Zamora and Colonel N'djai on an interim basis until an elected president of the Republic was sworn in. Critics argued that the

Constitution attributed the power to make such appointments only to an elected president. There was also some unease that more senior officers in the hierarchy had been passed over.

10. In a special debate on the situation in the country on 7 April and in the face of growing disquiet over the role of the military, the Minister of Defence, Artur Silva, assured Parliament that the situation was calm and that the military was subordinate to the civilian authorities.

11. The country's international and regional partners continued to show solidarity with Guinea-Bissau during the reporting period. The twenty-sixth ministerial-level meeting of the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council was held in Bissau on 19 March 2009. The meeting recommended that ECOWAS mobilize international support, including from the United Nations, for the preventive deployment of the military and police to ensure the protection of institutions of the State, Government officials and the electoral process. It recommended immediate steps to implement the ECOWAS plan of action against drug trafficking, using Guinea-Bissau as one of the pilot countries. The Council also addressed the issue of impunity and called for the creation of an international commission of inquiry into events in the country since August 2008, when Rear Admiral Bubo Na Tchuto allegedly carried out a coup attempt.

12. The CPLP Council of Ministers, meeting in Praia on 25 March, supported the establishment of an international commission of inquiry. It endorsed the ECOWAS proposal on preventive security deployment, if it was requested by the Government of Guinea-Bissau, coordinated by the African Union and undertaken under a mandate from the United Nations. However, on 1 April, the Minister of Social Communication and Spokesperson of the Government denied that the Government of Guinea-Bissau had made any request for such a deployment and highlighted that what was needed was international support for security sector reform. Subsequently, on 20 April, a donor round-table conference on security sector reform was held in Praia (see sect. IV below).

13. Following the tragic events of March 2009, the participatory dialogue programme *Voz di Paz*, led by the National Institute of Studies and Research in partnership with Interpeace, postponed its plans to validate the results of its 10-month grass-roots consultations last year. Instead, it initiated a series of forums in Bissau on the state of the nation in order to learn lessons from the events. The cycle of forums will culminate in a national forum on the state of the nation later in 2009. Validation exercises on the results were held in the regions with a view to turning the national validation, to be rescheduled later this year, into the culmination of a broad-based process that started in the regions. *Voz di Paz* is also strengthening the capacities of participants in nine "regional spaces of dialogue" through conflict mediation training and those of 20 community radio stations under the theme "media and peace".

14. The National Assembly held an extraordinary session from 6 to 9 April mainly to debate the 2009 budget, which was adopted with 65 votes in favour and 28 abstentions. The second ordinary session of the National Assembly took place from 4 to 22 May.

III. Elections

15. On 23 March, the Government requested United Nations support for the presidential elections. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) immediately provided assistance to the national authorities in mobilizing funds and deployed a team of technical experts to the National Electoral Commission and the Technical Electoral Support Office. The assistance also includes civic education and training for polling station officials. The Government presented a budget of nearly \$5 million, which envisages a first round and possible run-off election in the event that no candidate secures a majority in the first round. The budget did not, however, include costs related to security operations to ensure peaceful elections, amounting to \$700,000. The Commission, in a letter to my Representative on 7 May, requested that UNOGBIS coordinate the activities of the international observers. The European Union confirmed in early May that it would be deploying an electoral observation mission.

16. There were five candidates in the internal contest of the ruling PAIGC. On 24 April, Malam Bacai Sanha was elected as the party's candidate with 144 votes, as against 118 for interim President Pereira. Twenty candidates had applied to the Supreme Court to stand in the elections by the deadline of 28 April. They include former President Mohamed Yalá (PRS) and former transitional President Henrique Pereira Rosa (Independent). The Minister of Territorial Administration, Baciro Dabó, who had withdrawn from the PAIGC contest, applied as an independent candidate. Mr. Dabó suspended his ministerial duties for the duration of the campaign. Seven of the candidates are independent. The Supreme Court published a final list on 19 May validating 13 applications, including those of Mr. Bacai Sanha, Mr. Yalá and Mr. Pereira Rosa. The only female candidate is Francisca Vaz Turpin of the Guinean Patriotic Union.

17. Civil society organizations are undertaking various initiatives aimed at promoting peaceful elections. On 9 May, two youth groups supported by UNOGBIS launched a project aimed at promoting tolerance and mitigating violence during the elections in various popular suburbs in the capital. The project will be building on lessons learned from the UNDP quick-impact pilot youth advocacy initiative, conducted in 2008. UNOGBIS is also endorsing a culture for peace and code of conduct initiative called "night of peace for democracy", promoted by the Citizens of Goodwill, Voz di Paz and Justice and Peace, among other organizations. With a view to building expertise towards enabling free, fair and transparent elections, UNOGBIS, in partnership with the faculty of law of the University in Guinea-Bissau, will repeat a training-of-trainers course for election agents in June 2009, as was done before the legislative elections in November 2008. UNOGBIS has set up a fund to facilitate media coverage of the elections.

IV. Military developments and security aspects

18. The situation within the military in the period under review remained fragile and was characterized by deep distrust and an uncertain future. A number of military officers and civilians were arrested in connection with a parallel investigation launched by the military into the bomb explosion that killed General Tagme. Over the weekend of 21 and 22 March, the military set up roadblocks on access routes into Bissau and searched vehicles and houses for weapons, allegedly after a tip-off.

The home of the former Navy Chief of Staff was searched and some weapons were removed. Commander José Zamora Induta said on 26 March that those actions, as well as the arrest of Pedro Infanda, were preventive measures. On several occasions, the new military leadership accused unnamed politicians of attempting to incite the lower ranks against them. The security arrangements for the interim Chief of the General Staff were visibly increased, leading to recommendations by a parliamentarian in the National Assembly that the size of his escort be reduced.

19. The Defence and Security Reconciliation Commission embarked on its sixth round of consultations since its inception in 2005 with defence and security personnel in Bissau and the regions. The consultations were organized to discuss the events of 1 and 2 March 2009, the role of the defence and security forces in democracy and institutional collaboration between defence and security personnel. They also sought to prevent any disruption of the presidential elections by uniformed men. UNOGBIS provided logistical support for the regional trips.

20. On 23 March, the Government of Brazil handed the refurbished premises of the Military High Court over to the military authorities. On 26 March, the National Assembly Guinea-Bissau passed legislation authorizing a Brazilian military cooperation mission in the country, thus paving the way for Brazil to deploy the mission, which had been authorized by the National Congress of Brazil in September 2008. The Minister of Defence of Brazil subsequently visited Bissau on 27 March and held high-level talks with Government and military authorities.

21. UNOGBIS has developed a project with the National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons to hold five one-day workshops throughout the country to validate the national survey on small arms and light weapons. Two such workshops have been held, on 27 and 28 February, in the regions of Buba and Gabú. The workshops are an essential step in drawing up a plan of action to implement a small arms and light weapons programme with ECOWAS and the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the Secretariat. Following the events of March, the implementation by the National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons of a Canadian-funded pilot project to collect and destroy a limited number of small arms and light weapons in Gabú was postponed, as the security conditions were considered unfavourable.

22. During the reporting period, the public security situation deteriorated in Bissau. Twenty-one political parties called upon the Government to resign because of its inability to protect citizens and institutions, following two armed robberies of small shops in Bissau and the hold-up of a security vehicle transporting funds from one of the commercial banks to the Central Bank of West African States. Most of the 92 million CFA francs reportedly seized by the five men was subsequently recovered by the police, and the suspects, as well as their accomplices, were charged and are now in detention awaiting trial.

23. Fifteen agents from the Public Order Police and border and immigration services attended a three-day training workshop in Bissau, organized by UNOGBIS, from 8 to 10 April. The training focused on the role of the police in a democracy, ethics and legal conduct, the use of force and weapons and human rights. A second workshop will target police and other law enforcement bodies in the regions. Between February and April an area measuring 253,673 square metres was cleared of 7,804 pieces of unexploded ordnance, 4 anti-personnel mines and 43 detonators by the national non-governmental organizations Humanitarian Aid and Lutamos

Todos Contra as Minas, under the coordination of the National Mine Action Coordination Centre.

V. Security sector reform

24. Pursuant to the decision of the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council on 19 March (see para. 10 above), a donor round table on restructuring and modernizing of the defence and security sector in Guinea-Bissau was organized by CPLP, ECOWAS, UNOGBIS and the Governments of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde in Praia, on 20 April. The purpose was to identify the key constraints to the speedy implementation of the security sector reform programme and ways and means of overcoming them and injecting new life and dynamism into the programme. Participants included representatives from 29 countries, the African Union, CPLP, ECOWAS, the European Union, the International Organization of la Francophonie, the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations and Chairperson of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission and various United Nations agencies.

25. The round table made a number of recommendations, including the setting up of a pension fund, the creation of a police academy and the strengthening of institutional capacity to provide special security protection for democratic institutions and their representatives. With regard to the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime, the conference highlighted the commitment of the police forces of Guinea-Bissau to cooperate with the international community. It stressed the regional dimension of drug trafficking and the need for both a national and an international response. The conference also recommended that coordination of the dialogue on security sector reform with the international community be the responsibility of the Government of Guinea-Bissau, which could be supported by UNOGBIS. During subsequent consultations between my Representative and European partners in Lisbon, Brussels and London from 4 to 12 May, all have recognized the role of the European Union/European Commission in security sector reform and the need for a more coherent approach on security sector reform, including police reform. In this context, the role of the United Nations in coordinating the efforts of the international partners on security sector reform was reiterated.

26. A census of veterans of the war of liberation was carried out from 12 March to 25 April. At the request of the Government, the European Commission agreed to fund an additional exercise from 19 May to 6 June, as it was felt that there had been insufficient time to complete the previous one. The Government also agreed to extend the mandate of the European security and defence policy mission of the Council of the European Union, which was to expire at the end of June, until the end of November.

VI. Drug trafficking and organized crime

27. In March, the Judicial Police arrested an Eritrean national residing in Bissau, allegedly for being involved in the smuggling of two Eritrean citizens from the territory of Guinea-Bissau. In the course of investigations, the Judicial Police uncovered a network involved in producing false travel documents within the

immigration services. The case was reported to the relevant administrative and judicial authorities for action.

28. In the context of the Commission of Inquiry into the assassinations of President Vieira and General Tagme, Judicial Police officers trained with the support of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) proved to be instrumental in investigative operations, searches and case-building for the prosecution. On 27 April, UNODC organized the second two-month training session for 20 officers of the Judiciary Police at the Brazilian Police Academy.

29. In a letter dated 27 March 2009, the Prime Minister commended the crucial efforts of UNODC under the operational plan to combat drug trafficking and organized crime. He officially requested UNODC to complete the design of a police academy and a high-security prison in Bissau, within the framework of a trilateral partnership between UNODC, Brazil and the Ministry of Justice of Guinea-Bissau.

30. On 21 April, in the margins of the eighteenth session of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, held in Vienna, a programme concept was launched by UNODC, the United Nations Office in West Africa, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). The programme is a joint United Nations-INTERPOL initiative to support the implementation of the 2008-2011 ECOWAS regional action plan to address the growing problem of illicit drug trafficking, organized crime and drug abuse in West Africa. The overall objective is to reduce drug trafficking and counter associated organized crime in the region by providing assistance to strengthen both national capacities and cross-border cooperation among ECOWAS member States. Guinea-Bissau is one of the pilot countries.

VII. Activities of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Fund

31. The Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission continued its engagement with the country, focusing in particular on security sector reform and preparations for the presidential elections. The Commission held several meetings with a view to enhancing coordination, coherence and the prioritization of international support for Guinea-Bissau. On 25 March, the Commission held a videoconference in New York with national stakeholders and partners, including the Minister of Defence, representing the co-Chairperson of the National Steering Committee for Peacebuilding. The discussions focused on enhanced assistance for political stabilization and overall peacebuilding to be provided by the Commission in collaboration with national and international partners. On 15 April, the country-specific configuration held a videoconference on enhancing coordination and coherence in security sector reform initiatives in Guinea-Bissau with national partners and relevant international actors. On 11 May, the Commission held a briefing with the participation of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank representatives to discuss their activities in Guinea-Bissau. The Commission reinforced its call to the international financial institutions to apply flexible measures and to increase their funding for the socio-economic needs of the country, which are critical to peacebuilding.

32. The Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations, Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, in her capacity as the Chairperson of the Guinea-Bissau configuration, visited the country from 16 to 18 April. She held consultations with national political stakeholders and partners in order to maintain momentum and enhance the Peacebuilding Commission's engagement with Guinea-Bissau.

33. During the reporting period, some progress has been achieved in the implementation of the projects funded by the Peacebuilding Fund in Guinea-Bissau. As part of the Ministry of Youth/UNDP project on professional training and employment of youth, a training programme will be implemented in selected centres in Bissau and regions, targeting 500 young people, from June to September 2009. Training on enterprise creation and management was held for 17 trainers in April. With regard to the Ministry of Justice/UNODC project for the rehabilitation of selected prisons, discussions are under way between the Ministries of Justice and Interior on identifying another prison in Bissau for rehabilitation, as technical reports confirmed that the rehabilitation work on one of the four prisons selected for rehabilitation was not feasible. Delivery or handover of the refurbished prisons in Bafata, Mansoa and Bissau is expected to take place at the end of August. UNODC has acquired the logistics materials and equipment for the establishment of data management files in the respective prisons and a vehicle for the transportation of prisoners. Relevant specialized training for prison management will be organized by the Ministry of Justice and UNODC in June. Implementation of the Ministry of Defence/United Nations Office for Project Services project for the rehabilitation of military barracks is under way. Delays in the first phase, which should have ended in April, were hampered by the events of March, in which one of the military barracks to be rehabilitated was the target of the bombing. In determining the second tranche for the Peacebuilding Fund, it is critical that international partners and the international financial institutions prepare a common assessment of the country's needs on the basis of a coordinated approach.

VIII. Economic and social aspects

34. The fiscal and economic situation in the country is extremely difficult. The Government faces major challenges in repaying sizeable domestic arrears, including three months of civil service salary arrears from 2008 and two months of current salaries. Following the IMF mission to Bissau from 17 February to 3 March, the Government agreed to implement numerous measures to control spending, increase revenue collection and improve transparency and governance. It is estimated that Guinea-Bissau will need budgetary support amounting to \$44 million in 2009. Assuming that it meets agreed benchmarks under the emergency post-conflict assistance programme, the Government hopes to move to a Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility arrangement with IMF later in 2009.

35. The price of cashews on the international market is depressed, and producer prices have dropped considerably relative to 2008. Farm gate prices are between CFAF 75 and CFAF 150 (\$0.15 to \$0.30) a kilo as against CFAF 250 to CFAF 350 (\$0.50 to \$0.70) in 2008. Although the Government did not fix a reference price, it is negotiating with national private entrepreneurs to purchase cashews at CFAF 200 to CFAF 230 per kilo. Compared to the equivalent period last year, social tensions over food prices have lessened, owing in particular to controls on basic food and

fuel prices. However, a food security analysis conducted by the Government, civil society and development cooperation partners warned of a possible food crisis.

36. The continuing inability of the Government to pay civil service salary arrears is a source of social tension and disillusionment. The health and education sectors have been affected by a wave of strikes, further limiting access to basic social services, particularly for vulnerable groups such as children and women. Infant and under-5 mortality rates continue to increase, and over 45 per cent of school-age children do not have access to school. The lack of communication on the agreements regulating the disbursement and use of donor funds to support education contributed to misconceptions that exacerbated tensions between the Government and teachers. The repeated disruptions in schools, together with the late start of the school year in mid-December 2008, threaten to invalidate the school year. As a consequence, only 27,000 children out of 150,000 were fed under the World Food Programme canteen programme. In addition to having a chronic lack of power, the capital city of Bissau is suffering severe water shortages owing to a lack of power to operate pumping equipment. This heightens the country's vulnerability to cholera, which is endemic in Guinea-Bissau. In addition, about 200 children are trafficked every month outside the country.

37. The World Bank conducted multi-stakeholder consultations from 27 to 29 April in preparation for the 2009 interim strategy note. The Government and an Angolan bauxite-mining company signed an agreement on 8 May giving the company the concession to build, manage and operate the port of Buba, in the south. According to the promoters, the port will be the largest deep-water port in the subregion and is being built within the framework of a \$300 million bauxite-mining project in the south.

IX. Human rights aspects

38. The Prosecutor General on several occasions voiced concern that the lack of proper financial, technical and security conditions for the Commission of Inquiry impeded its investigation into the events of 1 and 2 March. The Commission was assisted by two officers from the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation. The UNOGBIS human rights unit followed the pre-trial investigation and monitored the proceedings with regard to respect for the rule of law and human rights standards. The Commission questioned the validity of the parallel military investigation and lack of cooperation from the military in disclosing the names of the military personnel on duty at President Vieira's home at the time of his assassination. The Judicial Police also complained of the inaction of military authorities in returning the military service men who were being held in Judicial Police detention cells in connection with the attack against President Vieira's residence in November 2008, but who were subsequently released by armed men in uniform on 2 March.

39. In a six-page document, the Military Commission introduced a report that comprises a 150-page document, 11 microcassettes and 5 tapes, all of which are meant to be handed over to the tribunal. The Prosecutor General has requested the full report and the 10 military suspects allegedly detained by the military. The various suspects detained by the military also include civilians who are not under military jurisdiction. Access to the detainees by lawyers and their families has been irregular and, according to the International League for Human Rights, some of the

detainees showed signs of torture. There were particular concerns over the health of a former Air Force Chief of Staff, General Manuel Melciades Fernandes.

40. On 2 April, an armed individual threatened the security of the President of the Human Rights League of Guinea-Bissau, Luis Vaz Martins, shortly after the League had issued a press release denouncing serious human rights violations committed by elements of the military. The threat followed the arbitrary detention and torture of the lawyer of former Navy Chief of Staff Bubo Na Tchuto, Pedro Infanda, on 23 March, and the physical attack against the President of the Audit Court, Francisco Fadul, on 1 April. My Representative issued a press statement reiterating the right of all citizens to freedom of expression and condemning the incidents. The Prosecutor General established a commission to investigate the events.

X. Implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) and resolution 1820 (2008)

41. During the reporting period, the gender thematic working group, co-chaired by UNOGBIS and the United Nations Population Fund, continued to provide support in the process of reporting to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. Following the forty-third pre-session working group of the Committee, held from 19 January to 6 February 2009, a list of questions was sent to the Government of Guinea-Bissau to be completed and returned together with the combined report and annexes, translated into one of the working languages of the Committee. In this context, the working group is providing technical support to the Institute for Women and Children under the Ministry of Solidarity.

XI. Staff security

42. The crime rate continues to be relatively low. One house burglary involving a United Nations staff member was reported during the period under review.

XII. United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau

43. In a letter to the Secretary-General dated 22 December 2008, the President of the Security Council noted the need to establish an integrated United Nations office in Guinea-Bissau, as recommended in the statement made by the President of the Council on 15 October 2008 (S/PRST/2008/37). The Council requested that I provide recommendations by 15 June. An inter-agency technical assessment mission to Guinea-Bissau was undertaken from 21 to 30 April to articulate United Nations priority objectives for peace consolidation for the country and to develop proposals for the establishment of an integrated United Nations presence. Following consultations with various departments and agencies, I propose that UNOGBIS be succeeded in January 2010 by the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) for an initial period of one year.

A. Mandate of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau

44. I propose that UNIOGBIS be mandated to assist the Government of Guinea-Bissau in, inter alia:

- (a) Assisting the Peacebuilding Commission in its multidimensional engagement with Guinea-Bissau;
- (b) Strengthening the capacity of national institutions in order to maintain constitutional order and full respect for the rule of law;
- (c) Supporting national authorities to establish effective and efficient law enforcement and criminal justice systems;
- (d) Supporting an inclusive political dialogue and a national reconciliation process as an institutionalized peace consolidation framework;
- (e) Providing strategic and technical support and assistance in developing and coordinating the implementation of the security sector reform strategy;
- (f) Assisting national authorities to combat human trafficking, especially child trafficking, drug trafficking and organized crime;
- (g) Undertaking human rights promotion, protection and monitoring activities and supporting the institutionalization of respect for the rule of law;
- (h) Mainstreaming a gender perspective into peacebuilding, in line with Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008);
- (i) Facilitating national efforts to curb the proliferation of small arms and light weapons;
- (j) Enhancing cooperation with the African Union, ECOWAS, CPLP, the European Union and other partners in efforts to contribute to the stabilization of Guinea-Bissau;
- (k) Helping in the mobilization of international assistance.

B. Structure and strength of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau

45. It is proposed that UNIOGBIS be headed by a Special Representative, who would report to me through the Department of Political Affairs. The Special Representative, at the Assistant-Secretary-General level, would be responsible for the implementation of the mandate of UNIOGBIS and the overall management of the mission. The Special Representative would be supported by a Deputy Special Representative (D-2), who would also serve as the United Nations Resident Coordinator and the UNDP Resident Representative. The Deputy Special Representative would act as the Head of Mission in the absence of my Special Representative.

46. The staffing strength of UNIOGBIS should include my Special Representative, his/her deputy and 38 substantive staff (27 international Professional staff and 11 national Professional staff). The Department of Safety and Security has indicated

that a total of 37 officers would be necessary, including 8 for the close protection of the Special Representative. The integrated office would be supported by 5 administrative assistants, 32 administrative support and logistics staff, 5 United Nations Volunteers and 16 United Nations police.

47. UNIOGBIS would comprise a front office to support my Special Representative and his/her deputy and four substantive sections focusing on the key areas of the mandate, namely political affairs, human rights and gender, security sector reform, and public information. Each substantive section would work with United Nations country team actors, as appropriate, on shared substantive areas of work under a common vision for the integrated United Nations in Guinea-Bissau.

48. The front office of my Special Representative would include a Chief of Staff (D-1), a Senior Strategic Planning Officer (P-5), a Policy Adviser on countering narcotics and organized crime, including trafficking in human beings (P-4) and a Special Assistant (P-3). The Chief of Staff would manage and coordinate the work of the substantive sections of the mission, represent my Special Representative in meetings when necessary and serve as officer-in-charge in the absence of my Special Representative and his/her deputy. The Special Assistant would assist my Special Representative in the execution of his/her responsibilities and draft relevant documents, including reports and code cables. The Senior Strategic Planning Officer would head and facilitate the work of the Strategic Planning Unit, which would undertake joint United Nations planning and promote the integration of the political and development aspects of the United Nations engagement in Guinea-Bissau to ensure coherence among the strategic aims and programmatic activities of all United Nations actors in the country. The Unit would also facilitate the engagement of UNIOGBIS and the United Nations country team with the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Fund. The Unit would include staff from the Office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator, the United Nations country team and the Peacebuilding Support Office. The Policy Adviser on countering narcotics and organized crime, including trafficking in human beings, would provide advice to my Special Representative and assist the Government in developing integrated responses to the threat of increased drug trafficking and organized crime. He/she would draw on inputs from the UNODC regional office based in Dakar, in line with the ECOWAS plan of action on drugs and crime adopted in December by ECOWAS Heads of State and Government.

49. The Political Affairs Section would be headed by a Chief Political Adviser (P-5), who would provide strategic analysis on internal and subregional political developments and sustain direct engagement with key national and international counterparts. The Section would include three Political Affairs Officers (1 P-4, 1 P-3 and 1 National Professional Officer), who would work on strengthening national democratic processes, building the capacity of national institutions, especially the Parliament, and support the electoral processes. One Political Affairs Officer (P-4) and one National Professional Officer would support the political dialogue and reconciliation efforts, engage with the political parties and provide mediation support as needed. One Political Affairs Officer (P-4) and one National Professional Officer would liaise with subregional organizations to ensure synergies and complementarities with the mandated activities of UNIOGBIS and work with civil society and local media. The section would also have one Legal Affairs Officer (P-4) and one National Professional Officer who would advise my Special Representative in legal matters, especially in relation to constitutional law.

50. The Human Rights and Gender Section would be headed by a Chief Human Rights Officer (P-5), who would provide overall analysis, strategic and policy development advocacy and guidance on human rights issues and advise my Special Representative on human rights, gender and the rule of law. The Section would include one Human Rights Officer (P-4) and one National Human Rights Officer, who would be responsible for collection, verification, analysis and reporting and ensuring that the human rights dimension is reflected in the overall activities of UNIOGBIS and the United Nations country team. One Human Rights Officer (P-3) and one National Professional Officer would provide capacity-building and technical cooperation assistance in order to strengthen national capacity for the protection and advancement of human rights, especially by building relevant capacities of the national human rights institutions and civil society groups, assisting the Government to formulate national legislation, training key civil servants and State authorities and supporting human rights education programmes, technical cooperation programmes and awareness-raising campaigns. One Gender Adviser (P-4) and one National Professional Officer would work on strengthening national capacity for the protection and promotion of the rights of women, with particular emphasis on ensuring their inclusion and participation in national decision-making processes and programmes pertaining to peace consolidation, including security sector reform. In addition, the Gender Adviser would mainstream gender into the peace consolidation efforts of UNIOGBIS in line with Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008).

51. The Security Sector Reform Section would be headed by a Chief (D-1), who would be responsible for the overall development of the security sector reform strategy and policy of the mission, provide advice to the Special Representative and serve as the primary liaison with national and international counterparts. The Chief would be assisted by one Security Sector Reform Officer (P-5) responsible for strategy, policy and plans. In addition, two Security Sector Reform Officers (P-4) would be located in the National Security Sector Reform Steering Committee and Coordination Secretariat, and would support national coordination and programmes. The Section would also include one Rule of Law Officer (P-4), who would liaise with UNDP and other actors by providing technical and advocacy support to justice sector reform initiatives, including in the corrections system. One Defence Sector Reform Officer (P-4) would provide technical support and analysis to the Chief of the Section and the Security Sector Reform Officer on the development of a national defence strategy, as well as strategies for the respective armed forces and legislation for the defence sector. In addition, he/she would liaise with and provide technical advice to ECOWAS and the European Union in the development of a national defence policy and the training of armed forces. One Senior Police Adviser (P-5) and three Police Officers (P-3), including one dedicated to the fight against child trafficking, would work on police reform and assist national counterparts in capacity development, establishing and implementing accountability and oversight mechanisms, as well as professional standards for the police. The Police Adviser and Police Officers would supervise the work of 16 United Nations police officers. One Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Officer (P-3) and one National Professional Officer would liaise closely with UNDP and provide technical support for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process.

52. The Public Information Section would be headed by a Public Information Officer (P-4) responsible for the development and implementation of an information

and communications strategy and plan in support of the mission's mandates on security sector reform, political dialogue, reconciliation processes, human rights and gender. The head of the Section would also be responsible for the development of a media strategy, including a capacity-building programme for local media. The Section would include one Professional Officer (P-3) who would work with the head of the Section to support national authorities in their information and communications strategy on security sector reform. In addition, two National Professional Officers would assist in the engagement with the national media and other actors, and one national staff member would manage the mission's website.

53. The ability of UNIOGBIS to effectively implement its mandate will be contingent on the availability of the requisite logistical capacity and resources and operational support from the Department of Field Support.

54. In order for the United Nations to be able to provide critical support to Guinea-Bissau in the post-electoral period and to ensure a smooth transition to an integrated United Nations presence, I recommend that the current mandate of UNOGBIS be extended for a final period of six months, until 31 December 2009. During that period, the mission will continue to provide peace consolidation support to national authorities in accordance with its current mandate. I also recommend that the Office put in place any transitional measures necessary to ensure the smooth transformation of UNOGBIS into an integrated office.

XIII. Observations

55. I am encouraged that the State institutions and political and civil society actors were able to find a consensual solution to the constitutional dilemma that confronted the country in the aftermath of the assassination of the Head of State on 2 March. I hope that this heralds a new page in the political life of the country, one that favours national dialogue to resolve the critical challenges that face the country and that require solutions based on national consensus.

56. As they prepare for presidential elections on 28 June, I urge the people of Guinea-Bissau to meet their civic responsibilities, as they did in the 2008 legislative elections. I equally call upon the presidential candidates and their supporters to ensure that they show, in their words and their deeds, a corresponding high degree of civic responsibility and respect for the rights of their fellow citizens to freedom of expression and association and to contribute to a peaceful environment before, during and after the elections. In particular, the candidates and their supporters are encouraged to respect the decision of the electorate, to pursue any appeals through the appropriate legal channels, and to accept the final outcome of the elections. The military should respect the Constitution and retain the separation of the military from the political landscape. At the same time, political actors should not use or manipulate the military for personal objectives.

57. The elections are a key requirement for the restoration of full democratic order and the creation of an environment conducive to the reforms necessary for the sustainable recovery of the economy and development. I commend the international partners of Guinea-Bissau for their prompt response to the appeal by the Government for the technical and financial resources to hold these elections. It is imperative that the national focus after the elections be on how to unite the country

to carry out tough reforms and revitalize the economy so that the goal of providing basic services and creating jobs can become a reality.

58. A credible commission of inquiry is essential for ending the cycles of violence and impunity in the country. Guinea-Bissau and its international partners need to work together to ensure that the ongoing inquiry does not suffer the same fate as others in the past, which had failed to bring perpetrators to justice, undermined faith in the legal system and encouraged impunity. Justice is the cornerstone of a healthy democracy. The United Nations and the international community have on several occasions expressed their readiness to assist the Government in providing resources and conditions to ensure a sound and transparent national inquiry that serves the cause of justice.

59. I am concerned about the arrests of critics of the military leadership and attacks against them, and that the parallel military investigation breaches the rights of those detained. Truth and justice cannot be served through human rights violations. I appeal to the Government to work to ensure respect for the rule of law and for human rights.

60. The Government is grappling with a precarious financial situation and faces enormous deficits in paying salaries and in providing resources for basic social services. I commend the efforts of the international partners in organizing the round table in Praia and the plans for donor conferences later this year. However, it is critical that the international community and financial institutions come together to find flexible solutions for timely interventions in the country's efforts to build durable peace. While I recognize that the adverse international economic climate is affecting all countries, I nonetheless call upon the international partners of Guinea-Bissau to assist the country, as it cannot resolve its problems alone. I reiterate my appeal to the Government and its partners to pursue a dialogue on maximizing international assistance and pursuing much-needed reforms in the public administration and security sector. The reforms would allow the country to better manage assistance and resources and to invest in basic services and development.

61. I should like to conclude by commending the staff of UNOGBIS, under the leadership of my Representative, Joseph Mutaboba, as well as the United Nations Resident Coordinator and the personnel of the entire United Nations country team, for the important work they continue to carry out in Guinea-Bissau.



Security Council

Distr.: General
11 June 2009

Original: English

Report of the Security Council mission to the African Union; Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and Liberia

I. Introduction

1. The present report of the Security Council mission to Africa from 14 to 21 May 2009 has three sections, covering the Council's visits to the African Union; Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and Liberia. Each section ends with specific recommendations to the Security Council, the parties involved and the international community. The present report follows the briefing to the Council by heads of the Security Council mission to Africa on 28 May 2009.

2. In his letter dated 12 May 2009 (S/2009/243), the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that the members of the Council had decided to send a mission to Africa from 14 to 21 May 2009. The segment of the mission to the African Union was jointly led by the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations, Ambassador John Sawers, and the Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations, Ambassador Ruhakana Rugunda. The Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations led the segment to Rwanda, while the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations, Ambassador Jean-Maurice Ripert, led the segment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, Ambassador Susan Rice, led the segment to Liberia. The composition and terms of reference of the mission are set out in annex I to the present report.

II. African Union

A. Background and context

3. The Security Council's visit to Addis Ababa fell within the framework of cooperation between the Security Council and the African Union under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. Meetings were held with the African Union Peace and Security Council and with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Jean Ping, and the Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra. The members of the Security Council also met with the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi. In addition, the Council members had the



opportunity to meet with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General to the Great Lakes region, former President Olusegun Obasanjo, regarding the situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region, which is summarized in section II of the present report.

B. Meeting with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Commissioner for Peace and Security

4. The Chairperson of the African Union Commission welcomed the increased links between the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council, the importance that the Security Council places on African questions, and its tradition of making field visits to gain a direct sense of the issues on the agenda of the Council.

5. Concerning Somalia, the members of the Security Council underscored their unanimous support for the work of the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and the Burundian and Ugandan troops that presently composed it. The Council was considering the extension of the AMISOM mandate for an additional eight months. However, the Council was very concerned at the precariousness of the present situation, which had further deteriorated in the days leading up to the Council members' travel to Addis Ababa. The Council had adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2009/15), in which it expressed its deep concern further to the latest round of fighting in Somalia, which it saw as a direct attempt to challenge the Djibouti Agreement.

6. Commissioner Lamamra noted that the African Union Commission shared many of these concerns. While the political situation in Somalia had been evolving positively, there had been a series of negative developments on the security front. Although AMISOM had not been attacked in the recent fighting, a large number of civilians had been killed and insurgent forces, though repelled, were reportedly regrouping. While AMISOM had a strong mandate, it lacked the capabilities to respond robustly. Uganda and Burundi were both ready to deploy further battalions. But the additional battalion pledged by Sierra Leone would take a minimum of three months to deploy. Some members of the Council also raised concerns regarding the alleged sources of external support to the insurgency in Somalia, and in particular from Eritrea.

7. Concerning the Sudan, the members of the Council underlined their concern about the continued serious challenges, both with respect to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the situation in Darfur, where the expulsion of a number of international non-governmental organizations had rendered an already difficult humanitarian situation critical. In this regard, the Council stressed the need to ensure the continuity of humanitarian assistance to the civilian population throughout the Sudan. The Council was encouraged by the work of the joint African Union-United Nations Chief Mediator for Darfur, Yipéné Djibrill Bassolé. It was more urgent than ever to build up the peacekeeping capacity in Darfur. Council members acknowledged that there were different views on how best to fight impunity in this context, but all were firmly in agreement concerning the importance of that fight.

8. Chairperson Ping underlined that the situation in the Sudan also remained a constant concern for the African Union. The situation must be addressed holistically,

taking into account the challenges of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) deployment, of the need for justice, and of relations between northern and Southern Sudan, among others. He pointed out that in an earlier communiqué, the African Union had regretted that the Sudanese Government had placed obstacles in the path of the UNAMID deployment. He further noted that constant and discreet pressure from the African Union had helped to clear some of those obstacles. On justice, the African Union had pressed the Government to consider the organization of a domestic judicial process. The African Union would continue to support all initiatives towards dialogue in this regard, including the recently launched initiative by Qatar. Finally, on the NGO expulsions, the African Union suggested that a tripartite structure to examine this matter might be established, comprising the African Union, the United Nations and the Government of the Sudan.

9. In closing, Chairperson Ping briefly raised the African Union Commission's concern at the growing threat of the drugs trade on peace and security of the West African region, including in Guinea-Bissau, and that Africa would require international assistance to combat it. He also called attention to the growing maritime threat to oil platforms in the Guinea Gulf with parallels to the challenge of piracy off the Somali coast.

C. Third Consultative Meeting with the African Union Peace and Security Council

10. The third consultative meeting between the members of the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council was intended to further the development of an effective partnership and enhance cooperation through an exchange of views on matters of mutual interest. The agenda included a discussion of the situation in the Sudan, the situation in Somalia, the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of Governments, and the financing of peacekeeping operations in Africa. At the outset of the meeting, which was co-chaired by the Permanent Representative of Burundi to the African Union, the Chairperson of the African Union Peace and Security Council, and the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom and Uganda to the United Nations, in their capacities as co-leads of the Council's mission to the African Union. It was agreed, after some discussion, that the meeting of the two bodies should be considered as the third in a sequence of similar consultative meetings between the Peace and Security Council and the Security Council which took place in 2007 and 2008. It was agreed that there should be further reflection on the modalities for the organization of these discussions.

11. Turning to the situation in the Sudan, the mission began by noting that UNAMID, as a hybrid operation between the African Union and the United Nations, was a concrete expression of the commitment of the two organizations to partnership. The members of the Council stressed the need to ensure the continuity of humanitarian assistance to the civilian population throughout the Sudan. The Sudan was now entering a critical phase, with elections planned in 2010 and a referendum in 2011. As such, the Sudanese parties should be strongly encouraged to overcome any obstacles to the full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Concerning relations between Chad and the Sudan, the African Union Peace and Security Council had met on 8 May, following the outbreak of renewed

conflict between rebel groups and the Chadian Government, and issued a communiqué deploring armed group attacks in eastern Chad and renewing its condemnation of any attempt at an unconstitutional change of Government in the country. The President of the Security Council had also made a statement on the same issue on 5 May 2009 (S/PRST/2009/11).

12. The members of the Council expressed serious concern regarding the humanitarian situation in the Sudan, with the rainy season in prospect and the expulsion of the international NGOs having radically reduced the capacity to meet assessed and critical needs. Overall, a dual track was needed, combining both political and peacekeeping initiatives. The recent announcement by the Sudanese Government of a timetable for elections was a welcome development — the conduct of free and fair elections and referendums was a vital dimension of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Within the Council, there was unanimity on the need to fight impunity, even if there were some differences on how to move towards that goal. Another Council member raised the question of the International Criminal Court indictment against Sudanese President Omar El-Bashir, noting that a middle position needed to be found, reconciling the imperatives of peace and justice. On Chad, the Council members underlined that any attempt to destabilize a sovereign Government was unacceptable.

13. On Somalia, the African Union Peace and Security Council considered that while there had been some progress on the political front, the security situation was once more of considerable concern. The Somalis urgently needed to be provided with the strength to ensure their own security; the Transitional Federal Government needed to be exempted from the existing arms embargo so it could effectively counter the present insurgency; and a full United Nations peacekeeping operation should be deployed as early as possible. In the meantime, the United Nations support to AMISOM should be fast-tracked, as should the financial support pledged at the recent donors' conference in Brussels.

14. The members of the Council considered that the situation in Somalia was precarious. Following the recent presidential statement (S/PRST/2009/15), some members of the Council expressed further concern over reports of flows of arms and fighters from Eritrea, in violation of the arms embargo. The Council was also presently considering a new resolution, which would provide a logistical support package to AMISOM through assessed contributions from the States Members of the United Nations.

15. The members of the Council shared the view that the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation would be important when the conditions were right. It was noted that, consistent with Security Council resolution 1853 (2008), some exemptions could be granted by the Security Council Sanctions Committee in order to train and equip the Transitional Federal Government and its security forces.

16. Turning to the question of unconstitutional changes of Government in Africa, the African Union indicated that it had taken a very strong position against a number of recent such changes in Government. The Security Council had also adopted a presidential statement on 5 May 2009 (S/PRST/2009/11), in which it expressed concern at the possible violence that might accompany such events, and welcomed the efforts of the African Union to settle conflicts and promote constitutional order in Africa; the Council also welcomed the decision of the twelfth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, held from 1 to 3 February 2009, in which the

Assembly had expressed the African Union's concern and condemnation of the resurgence of coups d'état.

17. Finally, the discussion turned to the financing of peacekeeping operations in Africa, and the report of the African Union-United Nations panel on modalities for support to African Union peacekeeping operations (the "Prodi report") (S/2008/813, annex) in particular. The Peace and Security Council proposed that a joint commission be established between the African Union and the United Nations to examine the Prodi report recommendations and to look at funding for their implications. With the economic crisis and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals at risk, it was not realistic to expect African nations to place major financial means at the disposal of peacekeeping efforts. A possible Security Council resolution authorizing assessed contributions to support AMISOM would, therefore, be greatly welcomed. The members of the Council underlined that it took very seriously the need to support the development of African peacekeeping, as demonstrated through the unique support package being developed for AMISOM. They noted that a report of the Secretary-General, including concrete recommendations in that regard, was expected by mid-September. All were agreed that there was an imperative to find better financial mechanisms, and this had been the genesis of the "Prodi panel", the African Union-United Nations panel chaired by Romano Prodi, former Prime Minister of Italy.

18. Following the conclusion of the substantive discussion, the members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council together adopted a joint communiqué, which is reproduced in annex II to the present report.

D. Meeting with the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi

19. During their visit to Addis Ababa, the members of the Council also met with Meles Zenawi, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, and discussed the situations in Somalia and the Sudan, and the recent difficulties between Eritrea and Djibouti. The Prime Minister indicated that he did not consider the situation in Somalia to be irreversible. AMISOM, however, would need urgently to be consolidated. Several members of the Council asked what more might be done to stem the reported arms flows from Eritrea.

20. On the Sudan, the members of the Council raised concern regarding obstacles to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and to the peace process in Darfur, as well as with respect to the expulsion of the international NGOs and the indictment of President El-Bashir by the International Criminal Court. The Prime Minister expressed concern regarding the slow implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and increasing instability in Southern Sudan. He also regretted the "see-sawing" of rebel movements between Chad and the Sudan over many years.

21. On Eritrea and Djibouti, the Prime Minister expressed the hope that Eritrea would take measures to resolve the differences between the two countries. He encouraged the Security Council to put pressure on Eritrea in that regard.

E. Recommendations

22. Taking into account the views expressed by the mission's interlocutors and the conclusions drawn from the various exchanges, the members of the Council recommend:

(a) Emphasizing the importance that the Security Council places on its cooperation with the African Union to address with effectiveness pressing matters of peace and security on the African continent, that the Security Council pursue further consultations with the African Union on ways and means to strengthen their cooperation;

(b) That the Security Council should continue to work closely with the African Union Peace and Security Council to strengthen further and enhance their cooperation, particularly in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, including the promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law and constitutional order in Africa;

(c) In particular, that the Security Council work closely with the Peace and Security Council to agree upon the optimum modalities for the organization of their consultations, including their next consultative meeting in New York, in 2010, at a date to be agreed upon;

(d) With reference to the report of the African Union-United Nations panel on modalities for support to African Union peacekeeping operations, including the funding of African Union-led peace support operations, that the Security Council should carefully consider the recommendations of the forthcoming report to be submitted by the United Nations Secretary-General no later than 18 September 2009, in accordance with the statement by the President of the Security Council of 18 March 2009 (S/PRST/2009/3), together with the African Union input to that report;

(e) In the light of the recent adoption of a presidential statement on the issue of unconstitutional changes of Government in Africa (S/PRST/2009/11), that the Security Council reflect on whether further measures may prove necessary at an appropriate moment, including in support of the African Union's own efforts to address such situations on the continent;

(f) That the Security Council remain actively seized of the deteriorating situation in Somalia, that it consider further measures to strengthen AMISOM, including through supporting steps to accelerate the deployment of additional battalions and through the possible adoption of enhanced mechanisms to ensure that AMISOM receives the necessary financial support in a sustained manner, and that it review whether further action may be necessary in response to reports of external support to insurgent groups, in violation of the existing arms embargo on Somalia;

(g) That the Security Council, working closely with the African Union, strongly encourage the Sudanese parties to overcome any obstacles to the full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, continue to provide all political and other support to the work of the Joint African Union-United Nations mediation in Darfur, under the leadership of the Joint African Union-United Nations Chief Mediator, Mr. Bassolé, and take further steps to accelerate the deployment to full strength of UNAMID and to support the implementation of the UNAMID mandate.

III. Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

A. Background and context

23. The Council's mission to Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo took place following recent major developments that significantly reshaped the security and political landscape in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region. In this regard, the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda agreed to work together to address the issue of the armed groups in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo which pose a threat to the stability for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region. Following the events of October-November 2008, when the renewed fighting between the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) and Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP) in North Kivu reached a critical point, CNDP announced, in January 2009, the change of its leadership; the end of hostilities with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and its agreement to integrate, alongside other Congolese armed groups, into FARDC. These undertakings were consolidated in the agreements of 23 March signed between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, CNDP, and the other armed groups operating in the Kivus, which were concluded under the auspices of former President of Nigeria, General Olusegun Obasanjo, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, together with his Co-Facilitator, the former President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Benjamin Mkapa. In parallel, and against the backdrop of improved relations between the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, the two countries began joint military operations against the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) on 20 January 2009.

24. On 25 February, the day after the conclusion of the joint Democratic Republic of the Congo-Rwanda military operations and the departure of the Rwanda forces from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and FARDC reached agreement on a joint plan to carry forward FARDC-led operations against FDLR in the Kivus. The operation, entitled "Kimia II", aimed to pursue the neutralization of FDLR by preventing it from reoccupying former positions and by cutting its lines of economic sustenance. Kimia II began shortly thereafter in North Kivu, with MONUC support. In the meantime, on 26 January, CNDP and other armed groups in North Kivu began an accelerated integration into FARDC. The newly integrated units were deployed throughout North Kivu to undertake the Kimia II operations.

25. In an effort to limit the humanitarian consequences of the military effort, and in accordance with its mandate, MONUC also focused on efforts to protect civilians. On the military side, this involved deploying up to 40 company operating bases and temporary operating bases in areas of known and assessed threat throughout North Kivu. At the same time, MONUC piloted a new concept of civilian joint protection teams which were deployed alongside many of the company operating bases and temporary operating bases to enhance coordination between the humanitarian and military communities on protection issues, and improve information-sharing and awareness-raising with the local population.

26. The Rwanda-Democratic Republic of the Congo operation resulted in a marked increase in the repatriation to Rwanda of FDLR combatants and their

dependents, as well as civilians. Since the beginning of the year nearly 8,000 Rwandans have returned. Of these, between January and February 2009, some 1,198 FDLR ex-combatants and their dependents took advantage of facilitated repatriation opportunities offered by MONUC and the demobilization and reinsertion programmes provided by the Government of Rwanda. Since then, a further 481 were repatriated as a result of *Kimia II* as at 1 May.

27. In Province Orientale, the Ugandan rebel group, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) exacted heavy reprisals against populations in Haut and Bas Uélé following the start of the joint Uganda-Democratic Republic of the Congo-Southern Sudan operations on 14 December 2008. Since the departure of the Uganda forces from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUC has continued to support FARDC-led operations against LRA, and has redeployed assets including two attack helicopters and one battalion to enhance efforts to protect civilians. At the same time, increased militia activity in Ituri in the months preceding the visit of the members of the Council also necessitated MONUC support to FARDC-led operations there.

28. Against this backdrop, the resignation on 25 March of Vital Kamerhe, the former Speaker of the Democratic Republic of the Congo National Assembly who had criticized President Kabila's decision to allow Rwandan troops into North Kivu, resulted in a further realignment in favour of the Presidential majority within the legislature. While preparations for the planned local elections were under way, the ability and will to conduct them in a timely manner before the scheduled 2011 national elections remained unclear at the time of the visit of the members of the Council.

29. In that context, the tenth mission of the members of the Security Council to the Great Lakes region aimed to express the Council's strong support for the improved relations between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, and to encourage them to continue reinforcing their political, military and economic cooperation, including with respect to stemming the illegal trafficking of natural resources, in order to guarantee the long-term stabilization of the Great Lakes region. The members of the Council also wished to stress the importance of reinvigorating the spirit of the Goma and Nairobi processes that, together with the 23 March agreements, constitute a viable framework to resolve the issue of the ongoing presence of Congolese and foreign armed groups in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

30. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the mission sought to emphasize the primary importance it attaches to protecting civilians, including with respect to sexual violence and children associated with armed groups, as well as combating impunity and respect for human rights. The members of the Council aimed to emphasize the responsibility of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in that regard, while reaffirming its full support to MONUC. The Security Council mission also sought to underline the need to enhance efforts to fight impunity and ensure that those responsible for serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law are brought to justice, including at a high level within FARDC. The mission wished to emphasize, in this regard, the imperative to address the scourge of sexual violence, which continues to exact a horrendous toll on the women and girls of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

31. Another important element which the members of the Council aimed to underscore was the need to intensify efforts to reform the security sector, including

immediate measures that could be taken to reform the army in the light of the integration of large numbers of CNDP and other armed group elements into FARDC, as well as with respect to the reform of the Congolese police (PNC). While recognizing the major challenge this will involve, the mission sought to underline that the international community was prepared to increase and better coordinate its support for Congolese efforts that were based on a sustainable and realistic strategy in that regard.

32. In terms of MONUC, the members of the Council wished to reaffirm its support for the work undertaken by the Mission in what remains one of the most complex and intricate environments ever faced by a peacekeeping mission. At the same time, the Council members aimed to seek the views of Government and MONUC interlocutors regarding the parameters of the MONUC mandate, its performance, and the future of the Mission, including with respect to its eventual drawdown and the progressive handover of its tasks in western Democratic Republic of the Congo, which was requested by the Council in resolution 1856 (2008).

B. Meeting with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, former President Olusegun Obasanjo

33. The Special Envoy of the Secretary-General noted that much progress had been achieved since his last briefing to the Security Council in New York in January 2009. In his view, the normalization of relations between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda was proceeding steadily. In eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, while the humanitarian situation remained difficult, there had been some improvements since the decision by CNDP and other armed groups to integrate into the Congolese armed forces, and the arrest of Laurent Nkunda. However, the situation remained fragile. At the operational level, salaries, support and logistics for the newly integrated ex-combatants remained uncertain. At the political level, challenges also remained, including with respect to the transformation of CNDP and of other armed groups into political parties.

34. The Special Envoy and his Co-Facilitator had in this context focused on providing political encouragement and exerting pressure on the parties through regular consultations with the Presidents and Government officials in Kinshasa and Kigali, as well as key stakeholders in the Kivus. Such follow-up, including through the aegis of the international follow-up committee established under the 23 March 2009 agreements signed in Goma, had already yielded concrete results, including the creation of the National Follow-Up Committee envisaged in the agreements; the passage of the Law on Amnesty on 12 May; the April meetings between the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to discuss modalities for refugee return; the meeting in May between the Governors of North and South Kivu as well as those from neighbouring provinces in Rwanda, Burundi and the United Republic of Tanzania; steps towards the removal of the remaining "parallel administrations" in parts of North Kivu by CNDP; and discussions regarding modalities for the release of CNDP political prisoners.

35. The Special Envoy also noted progress at the bilateral and regional levels. At the bilateral level, the "Four plus Four" Commission, bringing together the Foreign Ministers and Army Chiefs of Staff of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and

Rwanda, continued frequent meetings. The joint Rwanda-Democratic Republic of the Congo military operations against FDLR had helped to build confidence, and both Presidents had expressed their satisfaction to the Special Envoy regarding their political outcome. On the diplomatic front, the joint operations had also generated momentum for further discussions in the Four plus Four Commission towards both deepening economic cooperation and renewing formal diplomatic relations. On 7 May, Rwanda designated an Ambassador to Kinshasa, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo shared a list of possible Ambassadors to Kigali with Rwanda. The Democratic Republic of the Congo also recently made known its choice for the position of Deputy Head of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries. It was now important to concentrate on restoring full confidence. In the Special Envoy's view, the relationship between the two Presidents would need continued encouragement, and it might now be opportune for the two leaders to meet again, perhaps on the margins of the next summit of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, which is planned to take place in Zambia in June. At the regional level, the Special Envoy had remained in regular contact with President Kibaki, in his capacity as International Conference on the Great Lakes Region Chair, had briefed a wide cross-section of regional Heads of State, and had recently briefed President Ghaddafi, in his capacity as Chairperson of the African Union. Special Envoy Obasanjo also noted his intention to help the leaders of the region revive the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes region of Africa.

36. Looking ahead, Special Envoy Obasanjo outlined six priorities, namely, the consolidation of the newly integrated armed forces into the Congolese army, including through regular payment of salaries; concerted military, political, and legal actions against FDLR; the overall implementation of the 23 March agreements, backed by targeted international support; additional steps to strengthen the confidence between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; further international support to building institutions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and a focus on security sector reform in particular; and ensuring the continued engagement of Great Lakes leaders and the African Union, including the implementation of the "Stability Pact". The Special Envoy also suggested that a donors' conference could be held in the coming months to raise additional resources in support of recovery, the extension of State authority and security sector reform.

37. Members of the Council congratulated the Special Envoy and his Co-Facilitator on the success so far achieved, and again welcomed the rapprochement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighbours. They encouraged him to continue his work to help the region's leaders to deepen and consolidate that rapprochement. They further pointed to the need to bring the Democratic Republic of the Congo's natural resources fully under the control of the State, to the benefit of its population, the need to pursue efforts to help the Democratic Republic of the Congo to acquire a professional army, and on the vital necessity of vetting mechanisms to prevent those known to have violated human rights and committed acts of sexual and gender-based violence from holding positions within it.

C. Meetings in Kigali

38. In Rwanda, the Security Council mission, led by the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations, Ambassador John Sawers, met in Kigali with President Paul Kagame and Rosemary Museminali, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The members of the Council also had the opportunity to visit the Genocide Memorial at Gisozi, a stark reminder of the horrific events of 1994, the consequences of which continue to affect the subregion. The mission also visited a demobilization centre in Mutobo, where they met with recently demobilized FDLR ex-combatants who told the members of the Council their stories of life in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, and expressed their appreciation for the opportunity to return to normal life in Rwanda.

39. President Kagame expressed his view that the marked difference in the situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in the last six months, compared to the previous 15 years, was a result of increased ownership of the problem posed by the continued presence of FDLR in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He was encouraged by the improved relations between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, which had led to what he considered to be very effective joint Democratic Republic of the Congo-Rwanda military operations against FDLR in January and February 2009.

40. In the President's assessment, the joint operations had contributed to an improvement in the situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly in North Kivu. However, he felt that there was still a lot to be achieved and that the joint operation would have required more time to accomplish in full its desired results. The President expressed hope that the Rwandan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo Governments could find more grounds to continue to work together to address the problem of FDLR. President Kagame also noted the need to work with the international community to tackle the root causes of the problems in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, and not just the consequences, including the recruitment of child soldiers, sexual violence and the illegal exploitation of natural resources.

41. In President Kagame's view, one of the root causes of the problem was the absence of effective State authority in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the overall lack of governance and institutional capacity, which contributed to the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In this regard, he firmly refuted all accusations that Rwanda was involved in any exploitation of natural resources from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. That point, among others, was emphasized by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who in addition welcomed Security Council resolution 1857 (2008), by which the Council strengthened the linkages between the illegal exploitation of natural resources and sanctions.

42. In terms of the present situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, President Kagame expressed concern that the momentum generated by the joint Rwanda-Democratic Republic of the Congo military operation had not been sustained and that the follow-on operations led by FARDC had not yet been as effective as desired, with FDLR returning to locations from where they had been dislodged and carrying out attacks against civilians, creating further displacements.

He encouraged the Security Council to consider reviewing the MONUC mandate and strength so as to streamline and focus its activities on addressing the root causes of the problem. President Kagame also confirmed Rwanda's readiness to participate in future joint operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo against FDLR.

43. These points were echoed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who urged the Council to implement its resolution 1804 (2008), providing for the imposition of sanctions against leaders of FDLR who, often from their home bases in Europe or North America, perpetuate the hate and fear that impedes the rank and file from returning and reintegrating normal life in Rwanda. In that connection, while welcoming the measures taken in March 2009 against four senior FDLR leaders, she urged the Council to initiate a thorough investigation of the list of 19 suspects which Rwanda had submitted to the Security Council Sanctions Committee.

44. The Foreign Minister also informed the members of the Council of recent efforts undertaken by Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to solidify the improvement in their bilateral relations. She highlighted the recent appointment by Rwanda of its first Ambassador to Kinshasa, Amandin Rugira, since diplomatic ties between the two countries were severed in 1998. In addition, the Foreign Minister noted that Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo had reached agreement, in the context of the Four plus Four Commission, to develop a joint plan aimed at continuing cooperation on dealing with FDLR. The Foreign Minister noted that such cooperation could include the provision of military training to the FARDC. The members of the Council were also informed of concrete measures that had been taken to broaden and deepen relations at the regional level, including with respect to the revitalization of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Region and the meeting in May of the Governors of the subregion, which the countries involved had agreed would now take place twice a year.

45. The Foreign Minister also indicated Rwanda's readiness for the transfer of International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda cases to the Rwandan justice system. She also stressed the Rwandan Government's request that the Tribunal's archives be transferred to Rwanda.

46. The members of the Council welcomed the improved relations between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, which all agreed had had an important impact on the situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. They encouraged a broadening and deepening of the relationship, and welcomed the concrete measures outlined by Rwanda in that regard. The mission also welcomed President Kagame's reaffirmation that Rwanda stood ready to be part of the solution in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and to participate as necessary in the efforts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Government to address them.

47. The status of the peace process in Burundi was also raised with the President and Foreign Minister, especially in the light of the expected withdrawal in June of the South African contingent that comprises the African Union Special Task Force.

D. Meetings in Goma

48. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Security Council mission led by the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations, Ambassador Jean-Maurice Ripert, visited Kinshasa and Goma. In Goma, the members of the

Council met with the Governor of North Kivu, Julien Paluku, and senior FARDC and PNC officials including several *auditeurs militaires*. The mission also received briefings by MONUC regarding the ongoing military operations against FDLR, the Forces de résistance patriotiques en Ituri (FRPI) and LRA, as well as the United Nations Support Strategy for Stabilization and Security for Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. In addition, Council members met with the humanitarian community, including local NGOs. The Council mission travelled to Kiwanja Internally Displaced Person camp where they met with local authorities, internally displaced persons, and MONUC, including a joint protection team based there. Security Council members also met with victims of sexual violence at the HEAL Africa hospital.

49. Overall, the members of the Council agreed that recent developments in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the subregion were encouraging and had the potential to address one of the root causes of the conflict in the Kivus, namely, the question of the continued presence of foreign armed groups in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The developments also opened new opportunities to make progress on a number of pressing issues that have contributed to instability in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, including the much needed reform of the Congolese army and the restoration of State authority.

50. However, the mission observed that the situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo remained fluid and volatile. Operations against FDLR had been accompanied by an increase in threats and attacks against civilians by the armed group in both North and South Kivu, where planning had been completed at the time of the members of the Council's visit, but the military effort had yet to begin. The humanitarian situation also remained dire in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, with fresh displacements of populations in the Kivus, as well as in Ituri and Haut and Bas Uélé.

51. The integration of CNDP and other armed groups into FARDC had also not been unproblematic. A key concern observed by the members of the Council was that many of the newly integrated FARDC elements had yet to receive their salaries, supplies and equipment. As a result, some desertions from the FARDC ranks had been reported. More widely, they noted the urgent need to undertake root and branch reform of the security sector, beginning with the army, including as a key factor determining the eventual drawdown of MONUC.

52. The visit of the members of the Council to HEAL Africa hospital was a stark reminder of the scourge of sexual violence, and of the consequences of the ongoing conflict and pervasive impunity in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Horrendous stories were shared by those who had been victimized at times repeatedly and always brutally. In this connection, the Council members were informed that a list of five names of senior commanding officers within FARDC believed to be responsible for serious crimes had been submitted to Government authorities, without follow-up. The lack of properly functioning prisons throughout the country significantly affects the fight against impunity since very often those found responsible for crimes, including sexual violence, were able to escape incarceration.

53. The members of the Council also observed first-hand some of the challenges faced by MONUC in one of the most challenging peacekeeping contexts. While welcoming the increased clarity which resolution 1856 (2008) had brought to the

MONUC mandate, including regarding the use of force, the Council noted that the situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo had revealed the at times competing imperatives of protecting civilians and supporting FARDC-led military operations that had inevitable humanitarian consequences. In some instances, elements of FARDC itself were the source of human rights violations. In this connection, the rapid deployment of the additional capabilities authorized by resolution 1843 (2008) would nonetheless enhance the Mission's protection of civilians effort. They were informed that the deployment of those capabilities would begin in July 2009.

54. In this context, at the outset of the mission's meeting with senior members of FARDC and PNC, FARDC officials noted that peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo had come at the expense of a professional Congolese army owing to the need to regularly absorb illegal armed elements into its ranks. This also contributed to the pervasive lack of discipline among its troops. FARDC and PNC welcomed their close cooperation with and support from MONUC, and requested additional support in that regard. The FARDC officials also underlined the importance of security sector reform, particularly with respect to the army, but noted the practical challenges of making progress on this issue given the ongoing military operations in the Kivus, Ituri and Haut and Bas Uélé. However, MONUC maintained the view that training and active operations could be conducted simultaneously and reiterated its request that FARDC make use of two training centres the Mission had established for FARDC.

55. The members of the Council welcomed the cooperation between MONUC and both FARDC and PNC, and urged a continued focus on deploying well-trained and equipped police forces as part of the re-establishment of State authority and normalization of security functions in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. More broadly, the mission underscored the importance of making tangible progress on security sector reform, including with respect to justice. The urgent need to increase the number and deployment of judges to eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and establish functioning military prison facilities was also underlined.

56. The meeting between members of the Council and the Governor of North Kivu provided an opportunity for the Governor to outline several priorities for the Council's consideration, including encouraging the improved relationship between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda on political, economic and security issues; accelerating the implementation of the Prime Minister's Stabilization Plan for Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, including to ensure the re-establishment of State authority; security sector reform, including immediate measures that could boost FARDC performance in the Kimia II operations; sensitization of FDLR to encourage their disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and rehabilitation; and support for concrete measures to prevent the illegal exploitation of natural resources.

57. The members of the Council also received a briefing on the humanitarian situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The mission was reminded that while the situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo remained dire, basic human development indicators throughout the country area were among the lowest in the world. In North Kivu, 250,000 people were newly displaced as a result of the recent fighting, among a total of 900,000 displaced civilians in the province.

In a positive development however, 300,000 people had recently returned to areas formerly occupied by CNDP.

58. Council members were presented with five consolidated recommendations on behalf of the humanitarian community: encourage MONUC to condition its support to FARDC on the implementation of a mechanism to vet known abusers of human rights violations from among its ranks, including at the commanding levels; hold the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo accountable in the fight against impunity; enhance disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement or reintegration efforts to encourage voluntary repatriation of FDLR; appoint a Special Rapporteur on Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and accelerate the deployment of the additional capabilities for MONUC authorized by resolution 1843 (2008).

59. The Council members' visit to Kiwanja provided a first-hand opportunity to observe the practical application of the MONUC protection of civilians mandate. The Security Council mission was informed of the protection activities carried out by MONUC, which have been put in place since the start of the year, including the establishment of quick reaction teams, and an extensive early warning local network throughout the area of responsibility, which had reduced the reaction time of MONUC in the zone where this innovation was being tested to less than 10 minutes. The Security Council mission was also briefed in detail on the work of the joint protection teams, and their contribution to enhancing the protection of civilians. The mission also visited a camp for internally displaced people adjacent to the MONUC position in Kiwanja and met with representatives of civil society in the area.

E. Meetings in Kinshasa with the President, the Government and parliamentary institutions

60. In Kinshasa, the mission met with President Joseph Kabila Kabange, Prime Minister Adolphe Muzito and key Government ministers, including the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Planning, Human Rights, Family and Gender, Finance and Economy. The mission met with the President of the Senate, Léon Kengo wa Dongo, and the recently elected Speaker of the National Assembly, Evariste Boshab and members of both chambers. They also held a working lunch with Abbé Malu Malu, the head of the Independent Electoral Commission, the diplomatic community, the United Nations country team, and private sector representatives, during which they received briefings on the planned local elections and the macroeconomic situation. In furtherance to resolution 1856 (2008), the Council mission received a briefing from MONUC on the development of its Strategic Workplan.

61. President Kabila stated that, in his view, the situation had evolved positively since the last visit of the Council to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in June 2008. Relations with neighbouring countries, in particular Rwanda and Uganda, had improved and reached a level where in his assessment they could only continue to evolve positively. Noting that the recent joint operations with Rwanda against FDLR and with Uganda against LRA had been successful, the President indicated that the operations would continue by the Congolese army until those two foreign armed groups had been eradicated. He expressed an intention to continue to cooperate with the neighbouring countries in this regard through regular exchange

of information, and welcomed emerging concrete opportunities to enhance their political and economic cooperation. The Prime Minister, along with both chambers of Parliament, echoed the President in welcoming the joint operations against the foreign armed groups, and expressed their full support for the rapprochement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and other neighbouring countries.

62. In their meetings with the Security Council mission, both the President and Prime Minister noted that efforts were under way to tackle the conditions in which armed groups emerged and thrived in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, including with respect to stemming the illegal trade of natural resources and re-establishing State authority. Prime Minister Muzito stressed that the deterioration in the economic and financial situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo had made this effort more challenging, and expressed the hope that the international community would contribute to the Prime Minister's Stabilization Plan for eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, including through accelerated implementation of the United Nations Support Strategy for Security and Stabilization in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

63. The President, the Prime Minister, cabinet ministers, and the Parliament all agreed on the urgent need to make tangible progress on security sector reform. President Kabila noted that, in his view, the international community had focused on national elections, while support on security sector reform had been less than expected. He urged the provision of resources and technical support on that critical issue.

64. Regarding the scourge of sexual and gender-based violence, the President reiterated his view that addressing the problem of the continued presence of illegal armed groups would have an important impact on the incidence of sexual violence. The President and the Prime Minister committed to concrete measures to tackle impunity among the Congolese security forces, including with respect to following up on the five cases of senior FARDC commanding officers which had been submitted to the Government. It was also noted that the Senate and the National Assembly were working closely with the Government on judicial legislation to better enable the State to sanction and prevent human rights violations, including with respect to sexual and gender-based violence.

65. In this connection, the Minister of Justice outlined specific measures adopted by the Government to combat impunity, including planned trials relating to crimes of sexual violence to be held in North Kivu and recent improvements with respect to military justice, including the first prosecutions of elements of the elite Republican Guard and the decision by a military court to award reparations to be paid by the State to rape victims for unlawful acts committed by elements of FARDC. The Minister of Justice also informed the members of the Council of training initiatives aimed at increasing the number of magistrates in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which currently number 1 for every 30,000 people. At the same time, President Kabila reiterated his view on the need to pursue justice before peace to ensure the consolidation of stability in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

66. Council members were also informed by the Minister of Family and Gender of several concrete measures relating to sexual violence, including the establishment of a Government agency dedicated to women and children affected by sexual violence, a fund aimed at preventing and dealing with the consequences of sexual violence,

and the development, in collaboration with the United Nations, of a comprehensive strategy on sexual and gender-based violence.

67. The Prime Minister, along with both chambers of the Parliament, underlined the importance of holding the planned local elections in a timely manner. Regarding pending legislation relating to the law establishing an authoritative list of territorial entities, which should become the electoral constituencies, the President of the Senate expressed the view that the local elections could proceed on the basis of the existing laws in that regard. Some members of the opposition of the National Assembly noted that discussion was ongoing regarding the law relating to the establishment of the Independent National Electoral Commission, the successor body to the Independent Electoral Commission, which had been established in the context of the 2006 national elections. The Prime Minister, along with the Parliament, indicated that the deterioration in the economic and financial situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo had affected the Government's ability to commit resources to the process, which had also contributed to some slippage in the timeline. They encouraged the international community to fill the resource gap to ensure that local elections would be held in a timely manner.

68. Concerning MONUC, the President expressed appreciation for the role of the Mission, which had accompanied the peace consolidation process through some key milestones, including the organization of the national elections in 2006. While both President Kabila and Prime Minister Muzito welcomed the continued presence of MONUC in its current configuration for the next two years, President Kabila encouraged the Council to begin consideration of the eventual drawdown of MONUC, including an elaboration of prerequisites in that regard. In the immediate term, Prime Minister Muzito encouraged MONUC to continue to redeploy its efforts towards eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and focus on the protection of civilians. The Prime Minister also outlined the specific expectations of his Government with regard to MONUC and the Security Council, namely, the timely deployment of the additional capabilities authorized by the Council, greater engagement on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement or reintegration and security sector reform, facilitation of humanitarian assistance for displaced and other vulnerable populations, a complete lift of the arms embargo on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and support for the planned local elections.

69. Throughout the meetings in Kinshasa, Council members welcomed the measures taken by the Democratic Republic of the Congo to broaden and deepen the improved relations with Rwanda and other neighbouring countries. They urged the Government to continue to prioritize security sector reform and the extension of State authority in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The mission also welcomed the Government's commitment to take concrete steps to address impunity, including with respect to follow-up on the list of five FARDC commanding officers believed to be responsible for human rights violations. The President assured the Security Council mission that the necessary action would be taken with regard to those five. The Council members also strongly urged the Government and the Parliament to work together to accelerate the passage of the draft law required to enable the reform of the police.

70. At the Council's request, the mission also received a briefing on the development of the MONUC Strategic Workplan. The Strategic Workplan, which

was shared with the members of the Council, outlines priority actions and benchmarks in relation to the principal elements of the MONUC mandate on the basis of resolution 1856 (2008). The Workplan is based on two main transitional phases: (a) the deployment of the additional capabilities authorized in resolution 1843 (2008) for MONUC in support of stabilization in the Kivus, Haut and Bas Uélé and Ituri until mid-2010, after which consideration could be given to the drawdown of the MONUC military assets; and (b) the handover to the United Nations country team and other partners of selected MONUC functions in the western provinces within a 6 to 24 month period. In this regard, MONUC outlined key transition milestones, including continued stability in western Democratic Republic of the Congo; key advances in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, leading to the end of combat activities; advances in security sector reform, whereby FARDC progressively assumes security responsibilities from MONUC; and local elections held by early 2010. These conditions would enable the MONUC force to transition from area domination to a more mobile and concentrated response stance. Assuming that the planned general elections in 2011 would be organized and protection provided by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with limited MONUC support, various scenarios could then be envisaged for the drawdown of the MONUC force, taking into consideration the above milestones.

F. Recommendations

71. Taking into account the views expressed by the mission's interlocutors and conclusions drawn from the various exchanges, the members of the Council recommend:

Regional cooperation

(a) The Security Council strongly encourages the Governments in the region, in particular the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, to continue to build on the positive momentum created by their recent improved relations and to continue to take measures aimed at building confidence between them and laying the foundations for sustainable regional cooperation, including through the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries. It welcomes the appointment of a Rwandan ambassador to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and encourages the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to expedite the appointment of its ambassador to Rwanda;

(b) Within the framework of the Four plus Four Commission and the Nairobi communiqué of 9 November 2007, the Security Council also encourages the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda to continue to work jointly to address the issue of FDLR in a comprehensive manner;

(c) Special Envoy Obasanjo and Co-Facilitator Mpaka should continue to work with the Presidents and other senior figures in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda to consolidate and deepen their rapprochement, and, in particular, overcome any remaining obstacles to the full normalization of relations between the two countries, including at the diplomatic level;

(d) The Co-Facilitators should deepen efforts with the leadership of the countries of the Great Lakes region to enhance cooperation in the related areas of security and economic development under the framework of the Pact on Security,

Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region of Africa and other regional mechanisms;

Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

(e) Special Envoy Obasanjo and Co-Facilitator Mpaka should continue to follow-up on the 23 March agreements, through the international follow-up committee established by those agreements and in cooperation with MONUC, in order to support and encourage the signatories to implement their commitments in full;

(f) The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo should commit the resources necessary to ensure the payment of soldiers' salaries and their sustenance, including with respect to newly integrated elements from CNDP and other armed groups;

(g) MONUC should take all necessary measures, within its mandate, capabilities, and areas of deployment, to continue to ensure the protection of civilians, particularly in the context of ongoing military operations against FDLR and LRA;

(h) FARDC should take measures, with support from MONUC, to ensure the separation of children from armed groups, and ensure proper vetting mechanisms aimed at preventing the integration into FARDC and PNC of elements who have been involved in gross human rights violations;

Local elections

(i) Noting the continued importance of deepening democracy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo should continue to disburse its share of resources in full, and take necessary legislative measures to ensure that local elections are held in a timely manner;

Security sector reform

(j) With the support of the international community and MONUC, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo should embark as soon as possible on meaningful security sector reform, as a matter of urgent priority. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo should demonstrate its commitment, at the highest level, to work with partners on building FARDC capacity, and develop a comprehensive security sector reform strategy;

(k) The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo should accelerate passage of the draft law necessary to enable the reform of PNC, and continue efforts to deploy trained and equipped members of the Congolese police forces to eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in order to conduct regular policing activities in place of FARDC;

Rule of law and sexual and gender-based violence

(l) The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo should take decisive action to address confirmed human rights abuses by soldiers of the national army, including by holding officers responsible for crimes committed by troops

under their command. In this connection, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo should rapidly follow up on the list of five FARDC officers who are assessed to have conducted such abuses and remain in commanding positions;

(m) The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo should build on emerging concrete steps to address the continued prevalence of sexual violence throughout the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including by continuing to speak out at the highest levels against such abuses;

(n) Urgent consideration should be given to opportunities to strengthen the penitentiary system throughout the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

Illegal exploitation of natural resources

(o) The Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighbours should bring an end to the illegal exploitation of natural resources and cross-border trade, including through a normalization of trade relations within the framework of existing regional organizations.

IV. Liberia

A. Background and context

72. The Security Council's first visit since 2004 came after significant progress had been achieved in consolidating peace and stability in Liberia. Since the Government of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf came into office in 2006, significant progress has been made in establishing a favourable macroeconomic framework; Liberia has reached the decision point under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC); and the Government has finalized its first national poverty reduction strategy following broad-based consultations. However, Liberia's economic recovery started from extremely low levels, and poverty and unemployment levels remain high, resulting in mounting criticism of the lack of a visible peace dividend. The global economic crisis has also had a negative impact on recovery.

73. As such, the prevailing peace and stability in Liberia remains extremely fragile and vulnerable to disruption, partly owing to weak national security institutions. The problem of limited capacity of national security institutions is compounded by significant shortfalls in the country's justice and corrections systems, which contribute to the general lack of public confidence in national institutions.

74. Civil unrest could erupt from several sources, including protests of the remnant idle former combatants and unemployed youth, the more than 14,000 former Armed Forces of Liberia and police personnel who were retrenched and have not found alternative livelihood; mob violence owing to the lack of public trust in the extremely weak justice system; and persisting land and ethnic disputes in the counties.

75. In addition, there are a number of ongoing processes — including the final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the trial against former President Charles Taylor, and the presidential and legislative elections in 2011 —

that could generate tensions and be exploited by spoilers to destabilize the country. Furthermore, many ordinary Liberians do not feel physically secure because of the many incidents of armed robbery, sexual and gender-based violence and other violent crimes. The rape of women and girls remains a particular challenge, with studies suggesting that more than half of all women were subjected to some type of sexual violence during the conflict.

76. The underlying fragility of relative peace in Liberia is exacerbated by continued instability and unpredictability in the subregion, particularly the uncertain prospect of elections in Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire later in 2009, and the recent tensions between the two main political parties in Sierra Leone. Drug trafficking in the subregion is an additional challenge.

77. In that context, the Security Council visit aimed to reaffirm the Council's continued support for the Government and people of Liberia, as they rebuild their country and strengthen the foundations of sustainable peace, constitutional democracy, and economic development. It also aimed at expressing support for the efforts of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to promote peace and security in Liberia. Members of the Council further sought to assess progress made to build the capacity of Liberian national security institutions and to encourage the Liberian authorities to increase efforts in that regard; examine the impact of subregional factors on the situation in Liberia; express support for the Government's efforts to extend State authority; underline the importance of promoting and protecting the rights of civilians; and assess progress towards combating sexual and gender-based violence.

78. The Security Council mission met with President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and members of her Cabinet, the Deputy Commissioner for Training of the Liberian National Police (LNP), UNMIL senior staff, including United Nations police and military, and members of the UNMIL all-female formed police unit from India. The mission also met with representatives of the private sector, civil society, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and visited the Monrovia Central Prison and a training centre for former combatants.

B. Meetings in Monrovia

79. Upon arrival, a working dinner was held with members of the International Contact Group on Liberia, consisting of diplomatic representation of the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the European Commission, France, Germany, Nigeria, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Contact Group was joined by the Ambassadors of China and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, members of the UNMIL Management Leadership Team, the acting United Nations Resident Coordinator and the acting Humanitarian Coordinator. Interventions during the dinner held the consistent message that the presence of UNMIL had been crucial for the progress reached thus far in Liberia, and that the drawdown must be conducted in a deliberate and balanced manner.

80. On the following day the Security Council mission met with the Indian all-female formed police unit, and was briefed on its activities, which included public order tasks, static protection at key installations in Monrovia, joint patrols, and mentoring and capacity-building for the unarmed LNP, which continued to face logistical and capacity constraints. The formed police unit also assisted LNP in

efforts to combat sexual violence, a serious problem in Liberia, which is compounded by lack of education on this issue. Community activities included the Unit's establishment of an orphanage and school, and the provision of medical services to the population. The Security Council members were informed that the high visibility of the Indian formed police unit had motivated Liberian women to apply for posts with the police in increased numbers, something which was echoed and welcomed by President Sirleaf.

81. The Security Council mission also visited the Monrovia Central Prison, where UNMIL corrections officers mentor and build the capacity of their Liberian counterparts. The delegation was guided around the prison premises by the Minister of Justice and other officials, and briefed on the recent escape of 32 prisoners from the facility. The Minister also briefed the delegation on concerns regarding the prisoner population, including the fact that 86 per cent of all prisoners in Liberia are pre-trial detainees, as well as feeding and overcrowding problems. The day the delegation visited the prison, it housed 660 prisoners, of which 24 were women. The women's section, recently renovated with assistance provided by the Government of Canada, had adequate space and facilities for the inmates, as well as an internationally accepted ratio of inmates to corrections staff. Though one of the male blocks had been recently renovated with funding from the Governments of the United States and Norway, the Security Council mission was extremely concerned by the state of the oldest of the men's wards, which was overly congested, had limited sanitary facilities, and a very high ratio of inmates to corrections staff. The members of the Council also expressed specific concern regarding the large number of pre-trial detainees and the multiple prison breaks from the facility, including the mass escape that had taken place at the facility in December 2008, when 163 inmates escaped. The Minister explained that an in-depth investigation on that event was ongoing, and that early indications suggested it could have been facilitated by prison staff themselves.

82. The Security Council mission further visited a facility managed by the Community Empowerment Project, a national non-governmental organization that provided training for former combatants as part of the last phase of the United Nations-supported formal ex-combatant reintegration programme. The programme, which mainly targeted women, was carried out on behalf of the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Rehabilitation, in partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Government of Norway, who funded the final phase of ex-combatant training in Liberia. UNMIL also supported this programme through the provision of security and technical assistance. Some 373 former combatants (including 99 male former combatants) benefited from the programme, which included vocational training, adult literacy classes, business values training, and gender-sensitive sexual reproduction and HIV sensitization. The mission attended the graduation ceremony of some of the participants and commended the valuable work that the Community Empowerment Project was carrying out in support of the rehabilitation of former combatants.

83. The Security Council mission also met with representatives of the international enterprises ArcelorMittal, Buchanan Renewables, and Liberian Agricultural Company Rubber Plantation, which have started operations in Liberia. The representatives briefed the mission on the nature of their work, respectively in iron ore extraction, the use of unproductive rubber trees as a source of renewable energy

power generation, both in Liberia and elsewhere, and the production of natural rubber for processing and export. They briefed on the level of infrastructural investment they had already made in Liberia, highlighting the labour-intensive nature of their activities, and particularly in the case of ArcelorMittal, the huge infrastructural investment they had been required to make in Liberia before turning a profit. All of the representatives indicated that a strong United Nations presence and the subsequent stability had greatly contributed to their decision to invest in Liberia. All expressed serious concern at the prospect of a possible early withdrawal of UNMIL, describing the gains made in security as still not irreversible. The link between security and the level of investment was highlighted in that regard. The Security Council mission congratulated the representatives of the private sector, acknowledging the critical role of economic development in sustaining stability. However, the members of the Council also cautioned against a dependency on UNMIL since the Mission would eventually be drawing down. It also encouraged the Liberian diaspora, estimated by one Liberian at the meeting to be around 200,000 in the United States alone, to participate in the reconstruction and development processes in Liberia.

84. Some members of the Security Council mission also met with representatives of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to hear background on the work of the Commission and their concerns with regard to security within the context of the Commission's final report. The Chairman of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission explained that the Commission had identified up to 100,000 alleged perpetrators and taken 20,000 statements from witnesses. He also explained that the Commission was now conducting regional consultations to be followed by a National Conference on Reconciliation. The commissioners affirmed the precariousness of the security situation in Liberia, and confirmed that they believed there could be vulnerability to instability once the Commission's final report was released. This notwithstanding, the Chairman of the Commission affirmed that the Commission would make the content of its findings and recommendations public.

85. Other members of the Security Council mission met with a representative group of civil society organizations, who expressed gratitude for the work that UNMIL had engaged in over the past five years to stabilize the country. The spokesman for the group requested that the Council give careful thought to the UNMIL drawdown, with special consideration to the 2011 elections as well as the ability of the National Elections Commission to conduct credible elections; the development of rule of law institutions and the weak justice system; the extremely weak logistics and infrastructural support for security institutions, such as the Liberian Police, immigration services; and the new Armed Forces. Additionally, the group voiced concern that capacity-building activities had been plentiful for the public sector, but that civil society organizations had not benefited from such resources.

Security situation

86. UNMIL senior military and police commanders provided the Security Council mission with an assessment of the security situation in Liberia and current threats, and in this regard the impact of the UNMIL drawdown. The Security Council mission was informed that while the overall situation was calm, it was also highly unpredictable, with frequent unrest and demonstrations that often turned violent. Crime and mob action, armed robberies, and sexual violence continued to be

widespread. The high rate of youth unemployment and the limited opportunities available to former combatants contributed to the fragility of the situation, along with the lack of infrastructure and opportunities in the rest of the country that pulled increasing numbers of people into Monrovia, thereby creating frictions and competition for the limited resources and opportunities in the capital city. Land disputes were also a major source of instability in Liberia.

87. At the regional level, it was noted that while political relations between the countries of the Mano River Union (comprising of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone) were sound, the porous borders and the situation in Guinea were potential threats to the situation in Liberia, along with the presence of groups of Liberian former combatants along the borders, particularly in western Côte d'Ivoire. Fallout from elections in neighbouring countries, as well as Liberia, in the coming years also had the potential to threaten stability within Liberia. An additional source of concern was the level of preparedness of the Liberian security forces to assume full security responsibilities.

88. While there was no evidence that Liberia had become a key transit point for the international drug trade, marijuana production in Liberia exceeded local consumption. It was also noted that the geography of Liberia's coasts could be conducive to the illegal drug trade. However, the strong presence of UNMIL throughout the country may have deterred the use of its territory as a transit point to date.

Status of security forces

89. The Security Council mission was informed by UNMIL military and police commanders and LNP leadership that, despite ongoing security sector reform efforts, the Liberian security forces still lacked the capacity to assume full responsibility for security and law and order in Liberia, and that the security forces remained dependent on the support provided by UNMIL. The Armed Forces of Liberia, comprising 2,000 well-vetted personnel, was currently being trained with support provided by the United States. The size of the army had been determined primarily based on the Liberian Government's capacity to sustain the force. This force was not expected to be fully operational before 2012.

90. The Liberian National Police, comprising some 3,800 officers, was a largely unarmed force, with specialized armed elements. UNMIL is providing it with basic training at the Monrovia Police Academy, which was recently refurbished with the support of the Norwegian Government and UNDP. The training includes six months of classes at the Academy, followed by six months of on-the-job training. Stipends for LNP personnel at the academy were being provided through donors. The Liberian National Police's capability was still considered to be severely limited owing to a lack of sufficient logistical support, human resources and funding. Related to the issue of LNP being an unarmed force, it was discussed that the development of LNP was at such a level that a policy decision to arm the rank and file of LNP was not yet considered appropriate. The arms embargo was also a factor.

91. In addition, the development of the 500-strong LNP Emergency Response Unit is making steady progress, with 209 officers currently trained and equipped to date. UNMIL and the United States were providing assistance and equipment for the Emergency Response Unit, which is intended to be a mobile force capable of responding to large-scale internal security incidents. Though the initial 209 officers

are operational, they continue to depend on UNMIL for in-service development, and the full 500 officers are not expected to be fully operational as scheduled, since classes are falling short on recruitment.

92. Members of the Council were informed that the continued presence of UNMIL was therefore considered crucial to ensure that the significant gains made are maintained. In this regard, it was noted that an UNMIL troop strength of some 8,200 officers (including 5,000 combat troops) was the minimum required strength to ensure that the Mission could carry out its mandated tasks until the Liberian national security forces could assume these tasks, in accordance with the identified benchmarks.

Meeting with President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and the Liberian Cabinet

93. During the Council mission meeting with President Sirleaf and members of her Cabinet, the President noted that in the last six years there had been continued progress in the Liberian national recovery process and efforts to consolidate peace. However, the situation remained very fragile and the challenges faced were overwhelming. In addition to the major socio-economic problems, a large portion of the Liberian population remained accustomed to violence. The President reiterated the concern related to possible friction in view of the concentration of about 1.4 million people in Monrovia. While relations between the Mano River Union States were good, regional risks which could impact on the situation in Liberia included the uncertainties in Guinea as well as the situation in Côte d'Ivoire.

94. President Sirleaf outlined the Government's Poverty Reduction Strategy, which revolved around four main pillars: (a) peace and security; (b) economic development; (c) governance and rule of law; and (d) infrastructure and basic services.

95. With regard to peace and security, the President noted that the Government of the United States and the United Nations had supported security sector reform efforts. The members of the Council were also briefed by the various Liberian ministers on the security situation, and efforts to establish viable national security forces, which according to established benchmarks, should be able to progressively assume responsibilities for security and law and order within the next three to four years.

96. As for economic development, the President informed the mission that the Government needed to provide for the basic needs of the population, including former combatants, and was developing the economy around the mineral, agriculture and forestry sectors. However, these three sectors had not yet developed to the level where they could provide the required jobs. The Minister of Finance informed the mission that the international economic crisis has had a significant effect on Liberia's 2009 growth rate, limiting it to 7.1 per cent from initial projections of 12 per cent, a level which was lower than the 2008 rate of 9.5 per cent. Major enterprises operating in Liberia have as a result reduced the level of their activities, and the Government has had to manage public expectations at a time when it should be delivering peace dividends. The Government was working to reach the HIPC completion point, which would provide much needed relief from debt service and was expected to provide access to other sources of funding.

97. The governance and rule of law pillar was recognized as the weakest, and posed the most challenges, especially given the status of human capital in Liberia. The President outlined the Government's objective of building a responsible civil service and completely rebuilding a non-existent judicial structure, while at the same time combating corruption, which permeated every level of Liberian society. The Security Council mission was informed that the protracted years of war had led to a lack of trust in national institutions and a massive brain drain, which had weakened and factionalized the civil service. The Government was therefore actively trying to attract Liberians to return from abroad to help with the reconstruction process. Another key driver of conflict that needed to be addressed was the issue of property rights and land claims. In that regard, a national land commission was also planned to be established. The Minister of Justice informed that the laws in Liberia of over half a century no longer met Liberia's requirements, which had led to the establishment of a Law Reform Commission to update existing laws. Efforts were also under way to train judges and to establish a records system in the courts.

98. With regard to the fourth pillar relating to infrastructure and basic services, the Security Council mission was informed that the gross domestic product per capita fell from US\$ 900 in 1978 to US\$ 250 in 2005, which was indicative of the deterioration of the situation in Liberia. In that regard, the Government had prioritized as part of the Poverty Reduction Strategy, the rehabilitation of roads and the rebuilding of the country's electricity grid.

99. The President and members of her cabinet observed that it would be better for Liberia's overall image if UNMIL were withdrawn, but stressed that it was too early to consider a precipitous withdrawal before agreed upon benchmarks are achieved. Security Council members expressed their admiration for the successes achieved so far, and the Government's plans to address the remaining daunting challenges.

100. In response to questions from Security Council members, the President indicated that the endgame was for Liberians to have total ownership of all processes in their country and to take control of their destiny, in particular of their security. The police was seen as the biggest challenge in the absence of a lead nation that could support the process of establishing a credible force, as was the case with the United Kingdom and the Sierra Leonean Police. The President mentioned, however, that a national police strategy was being developed, including with the support of the United Kingdom Government, which would hopefully guide the solid development of LNP over the next three to four years.

101. Reacting to a question regarding the criminal code, which had recently reinstated capital punishment for committing armed robbery, the President acknowledged the concerns of the international community but requested that the decision be seen in the light of the circumstances facing Liberia, in particular the high level of criminality and pressure by civil society for stronger measures to be taken to address that situation. She undertook that the law would be reviewed once conditions permitted. In the meantime, this stipulation would be used very judiciously.

102. The President also outlined the Government's proactive efforts to address the issue of sexual violence against women.

C. Recommendations

103. Taking into account the views expressed by the mission's interlocutors and conclusions drawn from the various exchanges, the members of the Council recommend:

(a) While confirming that there will be no precipitous withdrawal of UNMIL, the Government of Liberia should step up efforts to build its military and police capacity to be able to assume full security responsibilities once UNMIL completes its mandate. In this connection, donors should increase assistance for standing up the Liberian security forces;

(b) Acknowledging the impact that the international financial crisis has had on the very fragile situation in Liberia, donors should continue to provide much needed support to ensure that the four pillars of the Government's Poverty Reduction Strategy are adequately financed; acknowledging the mutually reinforcing link between economic development and security, the Government should continue to support small and medium-size enterprises;

(c) Efforts should continue to encourage the Liberian diaspora to return to help build their country. In this connection, the Government should continue to create the conditions to absorb returning Liberians;

(d) Welcoming the Government's commitment to combat sexual violence, the Government should redouble efforts to address this critical issue;

(e) UNMIL should continue to support the Liberian authorities in consolidating peace, in accordance with its mandate. In this connection, the Mission should continue efforts to ensure that the identified benchmarks are met within the expected timelines. UNMIL should also continue to focus on building the capacity of the Liberian counterparts, in particular within the security sector.

V. Conclusion

104. Members of the Security Council mission wish to express their appreciation to all their interlocutors during their visit for the very useful and constructive exchanges of views. Ambassadors Sawers, Rugunda, Ripert, and Rice, in their respective capacities as leaders of the visit's various segments, would like to collectively express their gratitude for the Governments of Ethiopia, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and the African Union for their support and hospitality. They would also like pay tribute to the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and for Liberia, as well as to MONUC and UNMIL for their proactive participation and for contributing to the successful outcome of the mission. Finally, they wish to express their appreciation to the Secretariat for all its support.

Annex I

Composition and terms of the mission*

Composition

Ambassador Thomas Mayr-Harting (Austria)
 Ambassador Michel Kafando (Burkina Faso)
 Counsellor Long Zhou (China)
 Ambassador Jorge Urbina (Costa Rica)
 Ambassador Ranko Viločić (Croatia)
 Ambassador Jean-Maurice Ripert (France)
 Ambassador Yukio Takasu (Japan)
 Ambassador Abdurrahman Shalgham (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)
 Ambassador Claude Heller (Mexico)
 Senior Counsellor Vladimir Safronkov (Russian Federation)
 Minister Fazli Çorman (Turkey)
 Ambassador Ruhakana Rugunda (Uganda)
 Ambassador John Sawers (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)
 Ambassador Susan Rice (United States of America)
 Ambassador Hoang Chi Trung (Viet Nam)

Terms of reference

I Security Council mission to Africa: terms of reference

African Union

Led by the Ambassador John Sawers (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) and Ambassador Ruhukana Rugunda (Uganda)

1. To continue to develop an effective partnership and enhance cooperation between the African Union and the United Nations through an exchange of views on issues of interest to both the United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council.
2. To exchange views on situations of interest to both the United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council, which include but are not limited to the following:
 - (a) A brief overview of the peace and security situation in Africa;

* Previously circulated in document S/2009/243.

- (b) The situation in the Sudan:
 - (i) Darfur: the challenges to the political process and the functioning of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID);
 - (ii) Humanitarian situation in Darfur;
 - (iii) Implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the challenges being faced;
 - (iv) Sudan/Chad: the role of the Dakar contact group and the challenges to the implementation of the Doha Agreement and previous bilateral agreements;
- (c) The situation in Somalia:
 - (i) Political, security and military developments in Somalia and the functioning of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), including the United Nations logistical support package for AMISOM;
 - (ii) Piracy;
- (d) The situation in the Great Lakes region, in particular eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo: progress and challenges to stabilization in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo;
- (e) The resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government: efforts undertaken by the African Union to resolve and prevent unconstitutional changes of Government.

II Great Lakes region (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda)

General elements

1. To recall the commitment of the Security Council to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States in the region.
2. To express the strong support of the Security Council for the improvement of relations among the countries of the region and to encourage them to continue reinforcing their political, military and economic cooperation in order to guarantee the long-term stabilization of the Great Lakes region.
3. To reiterate support for the strengthening of the regional dynamic, including through the development, where appropriate, of economic projects of common interest and the implementation of appropriate steps to facilitate legal trade and put an end to illegal trafficking of natural resources.
4. To stress that all parties should reinvigorate their participation in the Goma and Nairobi processes, which are the agreed framework for stabilizing the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and urge all parties to fully recommit to their respective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration programmes.
5. To emphasize the support of the Council for action against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).
6. To underline the importance of full implementation of the sanctions measures put in place through resolution 1857 (2008).

7. To underscore the scale of the resources committed by the United Nations to peacekeeping in the Great Lakes region and the need for a clear commitment of cooperation on the part of all national and regional actors.

8. To emphasize the continuing concerns of the Council about the protection of civilians, to address the situation of internally displaced civilians and to advocate for respect for human rights and international humanitarian law, to raise awareness of the need for sexual violence and child protection issues to be addressed, and to encourage the parties and Governments concerned to ensure that those responsible for serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law are brought to justice.

Additional elements for the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Led by Ambassador Jean-Maurice Ripert (France)

9. To acknowledge the primary responsibility of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to consolidate peace and stability, and to promote recovery and development in the country, which require long-term sustained efforts and appropriate international support.

10. To reaffirm the support of the Security Council to the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and to receive a briefing on the MONUC strategic workplan requested by the Council in its resolution 1856 (2008).

11. To get updates on the Kimia II and Rubia II operations, jointly planned and conducted by the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and MONUC against the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), the Lord's Resistance Army and other armed groups, and to reaffirm that all military operations should be carried out in accordance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law and take appropriate measures to protect civilians.

12. To call on the Congolese authorities to intensify their efforts to reform the security sector, with the assistance of the international community.

13. To emphasize the support of the Council for the strengthening of democratic institutions, the rule of law, and good governance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including through the holding of local elections.

14. To examine ways to improve the protection of civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and in particular to strengthen its efforts to prevent and respond to sexual violence and to enhance child protection, bearing in mind the conclusions of the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict.

15. To recall the utmost importance of the fight against impunity, notably in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by bringing to justice those who have committed crimes and atrocities.

Additional elements for Rwanda

Led by Ambassador John Sawers (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)

16. To discuss Rwandan concerns in the region, and how these can be addressed while respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States in the Great Lakes region.

III Liberia

Led by Ambassador Susan Rice (United States of America)

1. To reaffirm the continued support of the Security Council for the Government and people of Liberia as they rebuild their country, strengthen the foundations of sustainable peace, constitutional democracy, and economic development and assume their rightful place in the community of nations.
2. To express support for the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and their efforts to promote peace and security in Liberia.
3. To review progress in the implementation of the mandate of UNMIL, in particular progress made in meeting the benchmarks outlined in the eighteenth progress report of the Secretary-General (S/2009/86), and assess the logistic constraints affecting the UNMIL troop and police mobility.
4. To assess the operational capacity and sustainability of the Liberian National Police and other national security institutions, and assess progress made in training the Armed Forces of Liberia.
5. To encourage Liberian authorities to increase their efforts to prepare national security institutions to assume greater responsibility for responding to law and order challenges.
6. To express support for the efforts of the Government of Liberia to extend and consolidate effective State authority in all 15 counties of the country, with the assistance of the international community.
7. To examine the impact of subregional factors on the situation in Liberia, and explore ways to strengthen regional cooperation, including measures to counter the threat of illegal drug trafficking.
8. To underline the importance of promoting and protecting the rights of civilians, in particular women and children, and assess progress in combating violence against children and women, including sexual and gender-based violence and sexual exploitation and abuse.
9. To underline the support of the Council for civil society, including women's groups.
10. To underline the need for full implementation of the sanctions regime on Liberia.

Annex II

Communiqué of the consultative meeting between the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the members of the Security Council of the United Nations

The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU) and the members of the Security Council of the United Nations held a consultative meeting at the headquarters of the African Union in Addis Ababa on 16 May 2009. This meeting was a follow-up to the two previous meetings in 2007 and 2008, held in Addis Ababa and New York, respectively.

Bearing in mind the Security Council's primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and the mandate of the Peace and Security Council with regard to the maintenance of peace and security in Africa, the meeting availed itself of this opportunity to review matters of common interest, in particular the enhancement of peace and security in Africa and the development of effective partnership between the two institutions, under the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations.

The meeting reviewed the situations in Somalia and the Sudan, the relations between the Sudan and Chad as well as the issues of unconstitutional changes of Government in Africa. The two bodies agreed to continue to work closely together on these issues, with a view to achieving concrete results. With reference to the report of the African Union-United Nations panel on modalities for support to AU peacekeeping operations, including the funding of AU-led peace support operations, the AU Peace and Security Council and the Security Council of the United Nations look forward to the report to be submitted by the Secretary-General of the United Nations no later than 18 September 2009, in accordance with the Security Council presidential statement of 18 March 2009 (S/PRST/2009/3), and to the African Union input to that report.

The members of the Security Council of the United Nations and the AU Peace and Security Council are committed to strengthening further and enhancing their cooperation, particularly in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, including the promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law and constitutional order in Africa. In this respect, the meeting welcomed the adoption by the Security Council of a presidential statement on the issue of unconstitutional changes of Government in Africa (S/PRST/2009/11), which will further enhance the African Union's efforts in addressing such situations on the continent.

The AU Peace and Security Council and the members of the Security Council of the United Nations agreed to pursue their consultations on ways and means to strengthen their cooperation and partnership, as well as on the modalities for the organization of their consultations. They agreed to hold their next consultative meeting in New York, in 2010, at a date to be agreed upon.

Addis Ababa, 16 May 2009

**General Assembly
Security Council**

Distr.: General
11 June 2009

Original: English

**General Assembly
Sixty-third session**

Agenda items 10, 101, 107 and 112

Report of the Peacebuilding Commission

Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund

Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit

Strengthening of the United Nations system

**Security Council
Sixty-fourth year**

**Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the
immediate aftermath of conflict***Summary*

In its presidential statement of 20 May 2008 (S/PRST/2008/16), the Security Council invited the Secretary-General to provide advice on how to support national efforts to secure sustainable peace more rapidly and effectively, including in the areas of coordination, civilian deployment capabilities and financing.

The present report focuses on the challenges that post-conflict countries and the international community face in the immediate aftermath of conflict, defined as the first two years after the main conflict in a country has ended. Reflecting on past peacebuilding experience, section II underscores the imperative of national ownership as a central theme of the report and highlights the unique challenges arising from the specific context of early post-conflict situations. The threats to peace are often greatest during this early phase, but so too are the opportunities to set virtuous cycles in motion from the start.

The immediate post-conflict period offers a window of opportunity to provide basic security, deliver peace dividends, shore up and build confidence in the political process, and strengthen core national capacity to lead peacebuilding efforts thereby beginning to lay the foundations for sustainable development. If countries develop a vision and strategy that succeeds in addressing these objectives early on, it substantially increases the chances for sustainable peace — and reduces the risk of relapse into conflict. In too many cases, we have missed this early window. Section III identifies several recurring priorities that relate directly to these core objectives, and for which international assistance is frequently requested in the early days after conflict. Seizing the window of opportunity requires that international actors are, at a minimum, capable of responding coherently, rapidly and effectively to support these recurring priorities.



Section IV describes efforts undertaken to date by the United Nations to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of its post-conflict response, and identifies systemic challenges related to differing mandates, governance structures and financing arrangements across diverse United Nations entities, which prevent the Organization from making deeper reforms.

Section V sets out an agenda to strengthen the United Nations response in the immediate aftermath of conflict as well as to facilitate an earlier, more coherent response from the wider international community. The core elements of this agenda include (a) stronger, more effective and better supported United Nations leadership teams on the ground; (b) early agreement on priorities and alignment of resources behind them; (c) strengthening United Nations support for national ownership and capacity development from the outset; (d) rationalizing and enhancing the United Nations system's capacity to provide knowledge, expertise and deployable personnel to meet the most urgent peacebuilding needs, in concert with partners who have a comparative advantage in particular areas, as well as assisting countries to identify and draw on the most relevant capacities globally; and (e) working with Member States, particularly donors, to enhance the speed, alignment, flexibility and risk tolerance of funding mechanisms.

Section VI considers the critical role of the Peacebuilding Commission in supporting post-conflict countries and proposes several suggestions for consideration by Member States as to how the Commission could strengthen its advisory role in relation to the early post-conflict period that is addressed in the report.

I. Introduction

1. In its presidential statement of 20 May 2008 (S/PRST/2008/16), the Security Council encouraged the Secretary-General, the Peacebuilding Commission, international and regional organizations and Member States to consider how to support national efforts in affected countries to secure a sustainable peace more rapidly and effectively, including in the areas of coordination, civilian deployment capabilities and financing. The Security Council also invited the Secretary-General to provide advice within 12 months to the relevant United Nations organs on how best to take forward these issues within the United Nations system and, taking into account the views of the Peacebuilding Commission, how to coordinate peacebuilding activities and encourage the mobilization and most effective use of resources for urgent peacebuilding needs. Accordingly, following consultations with the Peacebuilding Commission, I am submitting the present report to the Security Council and the General Assembly.

2. The report focuses on the challenges that post-conflict countries and the international community face in the immediate aftermath of conflict, defined as the first two years after the main conflict in a country has ended. When large-scale violence ends, the challenges facing the leadership and people of the country are enormous. The situation is fluid, the peace is often very fragile, and the needs of the people are far greater than the capacity to meet them. The threats to peace are often greatest during this early phase, but so too are the opportunities to set virtuous cycles in motion from the start.

3. The immediate post-conflict period offers a window of opportunity to provide basic security, deliver peace dividends, shore up and build confidence in the political process, and strengthen core national capacity to lead peacebuilding efforts. If countries succeed in these core areas early on, it substantially increases the chances for sustainable peace — and reduces the risk of relapse into conflict.

4. While building peace is primarily the responsibility of national actors, the international community can play a critical role. In too many cases, we have missed this early window. Time and again, we have failed to catalyse a response that delivers immediate, tangible results on the ground. Often, it has taken many months before essential government functions resume or basic services are available. In some cases, it has taken several years before the international community has aligned its efforts behind a common strategic vision. Capacities and resources have been insufficient to meet urgent demands on the ground. Even though capacity is limited, we frequently struggle to focus scarce resources on a limited set of agreed results that can enhance confidence in and commitment to a peaceful future.

5. Within the international community, the United Nations has a critical and significant role to play in peacebuilding. At the same time, the United Nations system is only one of several actors working to support post-conflict countries, and the coherence of this broader international effort is key to helping countries to succeed in their efforts to construct a viable peace. Partnerships and coordination among the main regional and international actors is essential since no single actor has the capacity to meet the needs in any of the priority areas of peacebuilding.

6. In the present report, I reflect on some of the lessons of peacebuilding and set out an agenda to strengthen the Organization's response as well as to facilitate an earlier, more coherent response from others. The core elements of this agenda

include (a) stronger, more effective and better supported United Nations leadership teams on the ground; (b) early agreement on priorities and alignment of resources behind them; (c) strengthening United Nations support for national ownership and capacity development from the outset; (d) rationalizing and enhancing the United Nations system's capacity to provide knowledge, expertise and deployable personnel to meet the most urgent peacebuilding needs, in concert with partners who have a comparative advantage in particular areas, as well as assisting countries to identify and draw on the most relevant capacities globally; and (e) working with Member States, particularly donors, to enhance the speed, alignment, flexibility and risk tolerance of funding mechanisms. National authorities, the United Nations system and other international partners can have a much greater and earlier collective impact if we agree on an early strategy with defined and sequenced priorities, and align action and resources behind that strategy.

II. Context and the need for national ownership

7. While every post-conflict situation is unique, the United Nations has accumulated a broad range of experience, and we have learned many lessons from supporting dozens of countries emerging from conflict. First and foremost, we know that peacebuilding is a national challenge and responsibility. Only national actors can address their society's needs and goals in a sustainable way. The imperative of national ownership is a central theme of the present report, as are the unique challenges we encounter arising from the specific context of early post-conflict situations.

8. Despite their diversity, the initial post-conflict period in most countries is characterized by significant insecurity and political uncertainty. We have learned that continued fragility and considerable volatility often accompany evolving peace processes. Stability in one part of a country may coexist alongside continued violence in other parts. Humanitarian crises and continued violations of human rights may continue to unfold beyond the formal cessation of hostilities. The end of conflict does not necessarily mean the arrival of peace: a lack of political consensus and trust often remains and the root causes of the conflict may persist. There may also be increased tensions as people return to destroyed or occupied homes. Impunity for serious crimes and atrocities, including sexual and gender-based violence, which may have occurred before, during and after the conflict can seriously jeopardize peacebuilding efforts during this early phase. Failure to restore State authority, particularly in remote border areas, may create new sources of threat or permit wartime practices of smuggling or illegal trade in natural resources to persist or even expand, undermining State revenue.

9. The end of conflict nevertheless tends to create high expectations for the delivery of concrete political, social and economic dividends. Building confidence in a peace process requires that at least some of these expectations are met. Equally important is effective communication and an inclusive dialogue between national authorities and the population, not least to create realistic expectations of what can be achieved in the short run.

10. There also needs to be a basic level of political will, commitment and consensus among the main national protagonists, without which most peacebuilding efforts will be futile. The extent to which a consensus can emerge depends heavily

on the conditions under which violence ceases, the quality of the peace agreement, and the nature of the peace process. Some peace processes are robust and inclusive and, as a result, have the support of a broad cross section of the population. As we saw in Cambodia, Guatemala, El Salvador and Namibia, peacebuilding efforts, while still complex to implement, benefited from a detailed agenda to address the causes of conflict. However, many peace processes are more fragile and require careful political reinforcement and determined efforts by international and national actors to hold the peace in the face of ongoing violence and opposition from spoilers. Some agreements even fail to establish minimum conditions for sustainable peace or an agenda for the resolution of conflict.

11. In some post-conflict countries, the capacity and will to exercise full national ownership may be constrained because the peace process is still ongoing and a stable political order is yet to be established. Many post-conflict countries are governed by transitional political arrangements until the first post-conflict elections are held. National authorities are often appointed rather than elected, put in place through a brokered agreement between parties to the conflict who may not be fully representative or recognized by the population. In addition, some of the national actors with whom the international community must engage may be implicated in past human rights abuses or significant atrocities.

12. International support in such complex and rapidly evolving situations is therefore a fundamentally political and often high-risk undertaking. Efforts that bolster the power of unrepresentative leaders, or empower one group at the expense of another, can exacerbate the causes of conflict or create new sources of tension. International actors need to be mindful of these considerations. Local and traditional authorities as well as civil society actors, including marginalized groups, have a critical role to play in bringing multiple voices to the table for early priority-setting and to broaden the sense of ownership around a common vision for the country's future. The full participation of women in these processes is essential, both as victims of the conflict and as important drivers of recovery and development.

13. Beyond the domestic political circumstances, establishing the conditions for peacebuilding is also significantly influenced by regional and international actors. Given that many conflicts have cross-border dimensions, neighbouring States as well as regional and subregional organizations play a critical role and have commensurate responsibilities in supporting peacebuilding processes. Regional organizations have increasingly been at the forefront of peace processes, including in mediating and guaranteeing peace agreements, and monitoring their implementation.

14. The support of United Nations intergovernmental bodies, individual Member States and other international stakeholders has proven to be crucial in the immediate aftermath of conflict when counterproductive behaviour by even one major actor can be very damaging. The Security Council plays an essential role in signalling strong international attention and support for a peace process and for the initiation of peacebuilding, calling on all stakeholders for their constructive support and engagement and authorizing a number of potential steps, including new peacekeeping operations, special political missions, panels of experts and other measures.

III. Recurring peacebuilding priorities

15. We know that when large-scale violence ends, the needs of the people tend to be far greater than the capacity of national or international actors to meet them. Given this imbalance, national and international efforts in the early post-conflict period should focus on meeting the most urgent and important peacebuilding objectives: establishing security, building confidence in a political process, delivering initial peace dividends and expanding core national capacity.

16. The challenge is to identify which activities best serve these objectives in each unique context. As my report of 8 April 2009 on enhancing mediation and its support activities (S/2009/189) outlines, peace agreements should provide an overall framework, but at times they set out an overly broad, ambitious and sometimes only preliminary agenda. Additionally, priority-setting must reflect the unique conditions and needs of the country rather than be driven by what international actors can or want to supply. Our plans and actions also have to reflect a clear understanding of existing capacities on the ground, whether they are national, subnational or international (including those of the operational United Nations agencies, funds and programmes). Scaling up these capacities and operations, where relevant, can yield the fastest and most effective results in the initial months.

17. In addition, experience and analysis accumulated over the last two decades, as well as numerous interviews conducted with national and international practitioners for the preparation of the present report, point to several recurring areas where international assistance is frequently requested as a priority in the immediate aftermath of conflict. There will always be additional country-specific priorities such as organized crime and natural resources management. However, seizing the window of opportunity in the immediate aftermath of conflict requires that international actors are, at a minimum, capable of responding coherently, rapidly and effectively in these areas, which relate directly to the core objectives mentioned above. They are:

- Support to basic safety and security, including mine action, protection of civilians, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, strengthening the rule of law and initiation of security sector reform
- Support to political processes, including electoral processes, promoting inclusive dialogue and reconciliation, and developing conflict-management capacity at national and subnational levels
- Support to the provision of basic services, such as water and sanitation, health and primary education, and support to the safe and sustainable return and reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees
- Support to restoring core government functions, in particular basic public administration and public finance, at the national and subnational levels
- Support to economic revitalization, including employment generation and livelihoods (in agriculture and public works) particularly for youth and demobilized former combatants, as well as rehabilitation of basic infrastructure.

18. Basic security and safety — whether provided by the State or with international assistance — are essential to the population and to create the needed

political space, and to enable the delivery of international assistance. Supporting the political process and reconstituting a stable and peaceful political order have to be central goals. The post-conflict government needs to build core State capacities that will help to restore its legitimacy and effectiveness, including the capacity to provide basic services and essential public safety, to strengthen the rule of law, and to protect and promote human rights. Visible peace dividends that are attributable to the national authorities, including early employment generation and supporting returnees, are also critical to build the confidence in the government and the peace process. Jump-starting economic recovery can be one of the greatest bolsters of security, and provides the engine for future recovery. These priority areas span across development, peace and security and human rights, reflecting the interlinked and mutually reinforcing nature of these areas, as repeatedly emphasized by Member States, including in the 2005 World Summit Outcome.

19. National capacity development across all these areas must start immediately. Too often, capacity development is seen in the context of international exit strategies from post-conflict countries. This is always too late. Inattention to capacity development constrains national actors from taking ownership of their recovery and limits accountability between the State and its people. It must be a central element of all peacebuilding activities from the outset and be targeted particularly at strengthening national leadership to forge a clear vision with manageable priorities.

20. Getting the timing and sequencing right among priorities requires a delicate balance and difficult trade-offs within the framework of a coherent strategy. Early security provision, for example, may be essential to prevent relapse into conflict and to deter potential spoilers to a peace process. The establishment of livelihood opportunities and addressing housing, land and property issues often requires early emphasis because it helps to meet people's most immediate needs and thereby builds confidence in as well as a commitment to peace. Other priority activities, if pursued too early after conflict, can undermine a fragile peace. Electoral processes can contribute to more legitimate political authority but may also be a source of tension and renewed conflict if they are rushed and the political environment is not conducive to holding them, if inadequate attention is paid to technical constraints, and the need to strengthen and nurture nascent political processes, community participation and civil society is ignored. When military forces or the civil service should be restructured is also often a delicate issue. In the past, national and international actors have arguably moved too quickly in some areas while moving too slowly in others, upsetting the balance between building confidence and exacerbating tensions. In the first two years after conflict, one of the greatest strategic challenges is to ensure that actions or decisions taken in the short term do not prejudice medium- and long-term peacebuilding.

21. The needs of women and girls require more attention, as recovery efforts may prioritize the needs of men. The early post-conflict period offers a critical opportunity for women to capitalize on the changes in gender relations that may occur during conflict where women may have taken on community leadership roles or non-traditional employment. A tendency by outsiders to work with and acknowledge the leadership of men in governance and the economy, however, can mean that women's capacities to engage in public decision-making and economic recovery may not receive adequate recognition or financing. Women's marginalization can be exacerbated in contexts where sexual violence has been a

major feature of the conflict, eroding public safety and women's social standing. As Security Council noted in its resolution 1820 (2008), persistent violence, intimidation and discrimination are obstacles to women's participation and full involvement in post-conflict public life, which can have a serious negative impact on durable peace, security and reconciliation, including post-conflict peacebuilding.

22. Over the past two decades, we have learned that no single template can be applied to fluid and complex situations. Maintaining flexibility and adaptability are essential while at the same time respecting fundamental principles of international law and human rights is essential. This cannot come, however, at the expense of predictability and speed. At the very least, we need to be ready to provide support in these recurring priority areas. In the past, our response has been slow and piecemeal, reflecting inadequate organization, a resistance to prioritization and common assessment and planning approaches, a lack of capacity in several priority areas and considerable deployment delays in others, and insufficient financing delivered through poorly suited funding mechanisms. Our collective task is to resist the temptation to create new mechanisms unless they are absolutely necessary. Rather, we should build on our experience of what works, and strengthen our capacities to ensure a more predictable, coherent and targeted approach to supporting countries as they emerge from conflict.

IV. United Nations efforts to date and systemic challenges

23. Over the past several years, the United Nations has been working to enhance its efficiency and effectiveness through reform efforts in several areas, ranging from political, peacekeeping, security, human rights and humanitarian, to development activities. Among the common themes of these initiatives is their focus on better coherence and coordination, clarity on roles and responsibilities, coherent integrated strategies, stronger partnerships among key actors, and a move towards greater predictability and accountability. In the humanitarian sphere, progress has been achieved through pooled funds, increased coordination, capacity and accountability in specific sectors, and strengthened support to country-level leadership. In peacekeeping, partnership frameworks with regional and other organizations are being developed and deepened to enable us to engage more coherently and effectively in support of peace and security. Development and humanitarian actors have been working closely to ensure that as humanitarian assistance draws down over time, coordination arrangements, increased capacity, programmes and funds are in place to maintain and expand efforts to help countries to establish the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Yet, many of these efforts have encountered serious systemic obstacles. For example, voluntary and ad hoc funding arrangements have frustrated many attempts to create real predictability and accountability for results. Member States have supported little or no standing capacities for many priority areas.

24. Bringing to bear the full force of the United Nations system in support of a country emerging from conflict presents unique and significant challenges. The United Nations has deep capabilities in the fields of peace and security, human rights, development and humanitarian action, and successful peacebuilding requires the combined efforts of all of these "pillars". However, the United Nations entities with capacity in these fields were each designed for a different purpose. Each of them has different mandates, guiding principles, governance structures and

financing arrangements — and different cultures and notions of how things should be done. As practice has evolved, each part of the United Nations system has developed its own set of external partners and stakeholders. This becomes a complicating factor for unity of purpose and action on the ground. Various parts of the United Nations are very rightly linked to distinct international instruments, each with its own pace and accountability. In this context, our efforts to “deliver as one” in the field are vital but not sufficient. The fragmented nature of governance across the United Nations system heightens the need for Member States to carry a common position into the multiple United Nations organs dealing with peacebuilding-related issues, and to work closely with us to better configure the Organization for a more rapid and effective response in the immediate aftermath of conflict.

25. A key mechanism to ensure greater coherence in this regard is the Peacebuilding Commission. The Commission’s establishment in 2005 reflects Member States’ recognition of the need for a dedicated United Nations mechanism to sustain attention, mobilize resources and improve coherence while addressing critical gaps, needs and priorities in countries emerging from conflict. Through its unique membership and working modalities, the Commission has promoted an inclusive and integrated approach to peacebuilding in countries on its agenda. As the Commission approaches a five-year review in 2010, the experience it has gained to date in supporting Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic could contribute to strengthening the United Nations peacebuilding architecture and informing the evolving nature and scope of the Commission’s advisory role.

V. Supporting a coherent and effective response: an agenda for action

26. I am strongly committed to an improved response by the United Nations in the early period after conflict, particularly by ensuring strengthened United Nations leadership and delivery capacity as well as greater levels of clarity, predictability and accountability within the United Nations system. This will require stronger and better supported leadership teams that are empowered to set out an early strategy with clearly defined priorities, working with national counterparts, and to align action and resources behind that strategy. The present report sets out an agenda aimed at achieving these objectives.

27. The elements of this agenda are interconnected. Agreeing on priorities and forging a common strategic approach require effective and empowered leadership. But a coherent strategy is meaningless without the capacity and resources to implement and fund it. Aligning funding decisions behind agreed priorities can help to drive all actors in the same direction. The absence or weakness of one element can undermine all the others. But they can also be mutually reinforcing, thus increasing our ability to support national actors in their quest for sustainable peace.

28. This agenda builds on the systems that are on the ground before hostilities cease, improving or augmenting them as necessary. A United Nations country team is in place before, during and after a conflict, led by the Resident Coordinator, who often is also the Humanitarian Coordinator during and for some time after the conflict. Once conflict ends, the United Nations presence on the ground may be configured in different ways and its presence may evolve during the first two years.

including bringing in the capacity of non-resident agencies as appropriate. Regardless of its configuration, the United Nations and its partners typically have considerable country expertise and humanitarian capacities on the ground that will continue to provide life-saving support based on humanitarian principles in the early post-conflict period. Some of these capacities can also be transitioned towards early peacebuilding priorities, particularly through those entities that have a dual humanitarian and development mandate, such as the United Nations Children's Fund, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the World Food Programme (WFP) and the World Health Organization. These agencies also work with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the Early Recovery Cluster/Network to initiate recovery at the earliest opportunity. This can help to jump-start the response, deliver early peace dividends and develop national capacities in key areas during the earliest phase, for example, by expanding essential services in health and education or rehabilitating essential infrastructure.

29. Also in this period, the Security Council may mandate the deployment of multidimensional peacekeeping operations or special political missions. Over the past decade, much of the focus and accumulated experience of the United Nations in supporting peacebuilding has been carried out in the context of integrated missions. Integrated missions emerged from a recognition of the interdependence of United Nations efforts at the country level and the need for greater coherence among these efforts, primarily through integration at the level of leadership and planning. This is particularly important with respect to peacebuilding activities where a coordinated engagement with and support to State structures and populations is often essential. More recently, we have started applying the principle of integration to a broader set of integrated United Nations presences in post-conflict countries, and we are developing new tools to strengthen the strategic partnership between United Nations missions and country teams, such as the integrated strategic framework. The main objective of these efforts is closely linked to the agenda set out in the present report, namely to maximize the individual and collective impact of the United Nations response. As we continue to move towards more effective integration, we will also need the support of Member States to ensure that United Nations rules and regulations allow for and facilitate collaboration among different United Nations entities at the country level.

Effective leadership, coordination and accountability

30. One of the core elements of the agenda set out in the present report is the need for stronger, more effective and better supported United Nations leadership teams on the ground. This will not only enhance coherence and collective impact among United Nations entities but also facilitate a more coherent response from other international actors. As the Security Council has noted, there is often a need for the United Nations to play a leading role in the field in coordinating broader international efforts in post-conflict situations, especially in the earliest phase. Despite these expectations, the United Nations has encountered a number of serious obstacles that the present report intends to address.

31. The United Nations faces unprecedented demands on leadership capacity as the number, size and complexity of peacekeeping and political missions has expanded dramatically in recent years. The extreme nature and scope of the challenge requires a highly unique profile. In addition to the essential political negotiation and mediation expertise, in-depth regional knowledge and requisite

linguistic capabilities, mission leaders should ideally possess demonstrated experience in strategic planning and management of large, complex organizations. As it is unlikely that a single individual possesses all of the skills and competencies required, the solution must be found in the development and strengthening of well-integrated leadership teams that would bring together the senior leadership of the political, peacekeeping and development elements of the United Nations country presence, where relevant. Individual appointments must contribute to the overall balance of complementary skills and strengths within the leadership team.

32. With this in mind, the Organization is building on efforts to succession plan and to better articulate the requirements of senior positions across missions. It is reaching out to potential candidates, with a particular emphasis on women, and broadening communication with Governments, regional organizations and non-governmental entities, as well as strengthening partnerships throughout the United Nations system and with our key multilateral partners. These partners, in turn, are better able to understand the unique demands of the field and assist in growing the pool of potential candidates capable of assuming these demanding responsibilities.

33. Given the magnitude of the task, leadership teams need to be supported by analytical, planning and coordination capacities in the form of small, unified teams of experts that can be rapidly supplemented by additional pre-identified expertise. These teams provide the support to bring the various parts of the United Nations response together, including providing a dynamic link with the political process, and facilitate a common approach among national and international actors. At present, such capacities do exist but they are still well below the level and range of expertise necessary to support an effective and strategic response. Experts continue to be deployed piecemeal with different rules and procedures to support separate parts of the United Nations in-country presence. This complicates their ability to come together quickly and work together effectively. Support for the Resident Coordinator is particularly weak because as the support provided by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs for humanitarian coordination winds down, it is replaced with considerably less capacity in the Resident Coordinator's office, just as the need for assessment, planning and coordination of recovery activities begins to increase.

34. However, there is presently no mechanism in place at Headquarters that looks at country-level leadership from a team perspective and ensures that the right leadership teams are in place and properly supported. Such increased leadership capacity and support is required in all peacebuilding contexts, irrespective of the configuration of the United Nations on the ground. *I have therefore asked the lead departments at Headquarters to create a senior-level mechanism with other key entities at Headquarters that will ensure that the right leadership and support teams are in place as early as possible.* This will include much more focused attention on how well our senior staff is functioning as a team. A greater degree of senior-level attention will help avoid the delays and piecemeal nature of most efforts to date, and accelerate and adapt existing mechanisms for identifying, recruiting and deploying leaders and support teams, as required, as well as troubleshooting where clear problems emerge. Ongoing efforts by relevant Secretariat departments and the Development Operations Coordination Office to strengthen the capacities they can make available to leaders in the field are being reinforced and accelerated. These capacities are funded either through the assessed budget or through extrabudgetary

resources. *I urge Member States to make the necessary funding available through these existing mechanisms so that shared analysis, planning and coordination capacities can be strengthened.*

35. Strengthening country-level leadership also requires improving guidance and support from Headquarters so that field presences can draw on existing capacities in a more seamless and coherent fashion, irrespective of the configuration of the United Nations on the ground. At present, integrated task forces are convened by the lead department for all relevant conflict and post-conflict countries. They are meant to bring together all the relevant departments and agencies of the United Nations system at Headquarters to facilitate coherent support to the Organization's in-country presence. However, the quality of support provided by these Headquarters task forces to the field has been uneven and not sufficiently focused on strategic guidance and the needs on the ground. This issue is being taken up by my senior managers, who have initiated a review and will submit their recommendations later this year as to how to make these task forces more effective and responsive to the needs of the field.

36. There is also a need to review the core elements of coherent and predictable Headquarters support and guidance to the field more generally. This will include reviewing the provision of coherent Headquarters support and guidance to Resident Coordinators and United Nations country teams, building on the existing Resident Coordinator framework and mechanisms, particularly in situations of armed conflict, political crisis or rising political tension where there is no political mission or office. Based on this review, I will build expectations for Headquarters support into my compacts with the relevant Under-Secretaries-General and monitor progress. The resources for Headquarters support of United Nations country operations need to be able to increase and decrease according to the country's changing political and operational needs.

37. Strengthening senior leaders' authority to ensure a more coherent approach among the United Nations entities on the ground should be accompanied by more robust accountability mechanisms. I have introduced "senior managers' compacts" for all Under-Secretaries-General and Assistant-Secretaries-General at Headquarters, but no similar mechanisms exist for Special Representatives or other Heads of Mission. Therefore, *I am taking steps to strengthen the accountability of my Special Representatives to reflect their substantial duties and responsibilities.*

38. The senior United Nations leadership in the field needs the authority to convene all United Nations actors to agree on priorities and the division of responsibilities, which should then be reflected in the Organization's integrated strategic framework. This framework could be used as a mechanism for mutual accountability between the senior representative and the members of the United Nations presence for delivering on agreed responsibilities. A system of mutual accountability would bolster the authority of the Organization's in-country leadership to ensure that United Nations entities deliver on agreed priorities in support of a common strategy, while allowing members of the United Nations team to provide valuable feedback on the leadership support they need. The "management and accountability system of the United Nations development and resident coordinator system" that was recently adopted by the United Nations Development Group could provide a model that should be explored further. *I will explore with my senior managers the development of mutual accountability measures whereby my*

senior representative is both empowered and held accountable for his or her performance by the system and at the same time he or she can hold each part of the system accountable for implementing agreed roles and activities, consistent with their mandates, based on the integrated strategic framework.

Assessment, planning and strategy

39. The establishment of a coherent strategy in a fast-moving and uncertain post-conflict environment requires the support and cooperation of a diverse range of national and international actors. At present, efforts to foster such a strategy are frustrated by disunity among actors, fragmentation of assessment and planning tools and the lack of a framework for prioritization. Key stakeholders often pursue competing individual agendas based on unilateral political, economic, security and institutional interests and perspectives. Bilateral and multilateral agencies re-engaging in a country after conflict may set in motion multiple, separate and often competing programmes without a clear or coherent vision as to the needs and priorities of the country, or a link to the unfolding peace process. Within the United Nations, despite ongoing efforts to integrate planning for security, efforts aimed at political, humanitarian and development remain a serious challenge.

40. The capacities and tools at our disposal within the Organization vary depending on the United Nations presence on the ground immediately following conflict and how that presence evolves during the first two years. In cases with Security Council-mandated missions, the United Nations internal integrated mission planning process is focused on ensuring unity of purpose in-country through establishing a shared vision and agreed priorities. Although we have made substantial progress, the Organization still needs to improve its ability to agree on and deliver a critical set of priorities for early post-conflict environments. In this context, my decision that all United Nations integrated presences have a shared analytical and planning capacity, as well as an integrated strategic framework, represents an important step forward. The United Nations integrated strategic framework is meant to articulate a shared vision of the Organization's strategic objectives as well as a related set of agreed results, timelines, and responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace. The integrated mission planning process, while focused on the coherence and coordination of United Nations strategies and operations, is also designed to align United Nations roles, capacity and scarce resources in specific country situations with national priorities and the roles of other international actors.

41. Effective peacebuilding also requires a level of international support that goes beyond that provided by the United Nations. Experience has shown that when the United Nations and the World Bank work closely together they can provide a valuable platform for a coherent approach between national and international actors. Over the last several years, the United Nations Development Group and the World Bank, recently joined by the European Commission, have expanded their partnership in post-conflict environments. The focus has been on developing an in-country and nationally led common assessment and priority-setting methodology, known as the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment. This methodology seeks to situate local actors at the centre of the assessment process. It is focused on immediate and medium-term peacebuilding and recovery assistance needs and provides the basis for discussion with national actors, leading in time to the development of a national framework for peace consolidation and recovery, which can guide international and

national resource allocation. It is intended to be an iterative process, which can be initiated rapidly and successively expanded and detailed over time, with greater national involvement and ownership. The national framework for peace consolidation and recovery can then provide the basis for a compact that can be used by both national and international partners in monitoring progress against commitments. The Peacebuilding Commission could have an important role to play in monitoring progress against such compacts.

42. Over the last year, the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment methodology has been significantly revised to reflect political and security dimensions and to enable more effective engagement with political and security actors present on the ground. The revised methodology provides a framework for a more coherent and rationalized approach to aid coordination. *I encourage Member States with significant in-country presence to join Post-Conflict Needs Assessment processes, as appropriate, and all Member States to align funding with the resulting outcome.*

43. The United Nations integrated mission planning process and the national peace consolidation and recovery framework derived through the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment methodology follow different timelines and serve different purposes, but they need to be complementary and mutually reinforcing. The senior United Nations leadership team has a responsibility to ensure the strategic coherence and appropriate linkages between the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment and the United Nations internal planning processes by maintaining an ongoing dialogue around a common vision with the key national, regional and international stakeholders.

44. Notwithstanding the important progress on integrated planning and common assessments, United Nations and non-United Nations actors on the ground are often slow to adapt to changing political circumstances when conflict ends and new missions take time to deploy and become operational. There is still too often a gap in terms of clear prioritization and new or revised plans for implementation in the early months, before a mission may be fully deployed or more extensive assessments have taken place in advance of a major donor conference. Efforts to fill this gap should be guided by the terms of the peace process, mandates provided by the Security Council, and existing planning and activities of the United Nations country team. Ongoing activities that are essential to the success of peacebuilding should also be included. *My senior representatives on the ground will convene relevant actors in the immediate aftermath of conflict and develop an early strategy and action plan focusing on immediate national priorities, appropriate sequencing of priority initiatives, and clear delineation of roles and responsibilities for activities that have to be implemented or supported by the United Nations and funded right from the start, including through an early Peacebuilding Fund disbursement. Relevant World Bank activities should also be reflected.* Where a mission is deployed or being planned, an early iteration of an integrated strategic framework should be used for this purpose. Doing so will help to bring all relevant actors around a common and limited set of priorities quickly, thereby also enabling bilateral and multilateral actors to align their early funding decisions behind a common strategy.

National capacity development

45. As discussed above, capacity development has to be considered from the outset and should be a central element of all peacebuilding efforts. Enhancing

leadership and aid coordination capacity is particularly important in the early days because it enables national leaders to drive their country's recovery and to better manage their relationship with international partners. Too often major international operations have failed to draw on the capacities that do exist. Such operations have also undermined opportunities for national capacity development by relying too heavily on international personnel to substitute in areas where capacity may be lacking, without paying adequate attention to capacity development needs in those areas.

46. The extent to which human and institutional capacities are depleted by conflict varies significantly from country to country. Too often the international community begins activities in a post-conflict country without first assessing what capacities exist. There is a tendency to assume that capacity has been completely depleted, rather than finding existing capacity and strengthening it. *Post-conflict peacebuilding should begin with an assessment of existing capacities and needs in the typical priority areas at the national and subnational levels using agreed common assessment tools. The results of such assessments should then inform decisions on the design of support and the deployment of international resources and expertise.*

47. As part of the humanitarian response, the Early Recovery Cluster/Network provides an important foundation for later efforts by protecting and investing in people's livelihoods and developing the capacity of community leaders, civil society organizations and local government in pockets of peace, and assessing national capacity in key sectors and institutions, where possible. This can facilitate efforts to identify and mobilize existing national and local capacity once conflict ends. The Cluster also ensures that assistance adapts to the rapidly evolving political situation in the early days after conflict, including the need to transition international actors from providing services directly to populations, to supporting national actors to provide those services.

48. International organizations often recruit qualified national professionals away from local institutions and organizations through financial and other incentives. This undermines the need to strengthen national institutions and distorts the domestic economy. Early and sustained support to the civil service and local institutions is crucial to provide adequate compensation and conditions for professionals who remain within domestic structures where their contribution to peacebuilding and recovery may have greatest impact.

49. Using and supporting national capacity should be the first preference for international assistance. Representatives from the diaspora can also be an important resource of knowledge and expertise, although experience shows that mobilizing the diaspora is potentially a politically sensitive undertaking that must be carefully managed. If there is need for international expertise, regional experts would be most effective, given their language skills and knowledge of local conditions. The substitution of international capacity to perform critical peacebuilding tasks, even if only on a short-term and limited basis, must be approached cautiously and on the basis of demonstrable need. At a minimum, it must not undermine or replace existing national capacities and should be accompanied by efforts to develop the necessary capacity. *Where the international community is requested to provide international technical capacity to support line-functions in national Governments, this must be accompanied by capacity development programmes.*

50. *Building on existing structures and mechanisms in the field, the senior United Nations leadership team should ensure that there is sufficient dedicated expertise to promote and coordinate capacity development efforts, and to strengthen mutual accountability between national and international partners. Additional financial support (both within mission budgets and voluntary funding as appropriate) will be required to ensure that capacity development strategies are put in place from the outset of a post-conflict effort.*

Predictable international support

51. Being ready to rapidly ramp up a coherent international response in the immediate aftermath of conflict requires predictable technical support in the recurring priority areas outlined above. As part of this response, the United Nations needs ready capacity to ensure that country-level leaders can draw on the knowledge and expertise of diverse United Nations entities. Member States, regional and subregional organizations also have important capacities that are deployed as part of a broader international response. However, a number of steps need to be taken to ensure that international capacities are in place to meet recurring demands in a timely, well-coordinated and complementary manner. Across all priority areas, the United Nations and other international actors face considerable challenges identifying, recruiting and deploying the right individuals who have the requisite technical knowledge as well as applicable experience in post-conflict or difficult settings. Finding this unique combination at short notice is particularly challenging and requires pre-positioning some capacity for immediate deployment and ensuring that we have the ability to put more substantial expertise in place relatively quickly.

Predictable international support: clarity within the United Nations system

52. The United Nations faces severe shortages of expertise and capacity in several of the recurring priority areas outlined above. For some of these areas, this problem is rooted in a lack of institutional clarity as to which entities are responsible for providing United Nations country-level leaders with access to readily available knowledge, expertise and guidance, as well as for investing in rapidly deployable capacity. This limits the predictability of the United Nations response and hampers our ability to move quickly in the immediate aftermath of conflict. Work is already under way in several areas. For example, I have identified designated entities at Headquarters that should provide system-wide service in their respective area of expertise. This responsibility entails serving as a knowledge resource, including for best practices and lessons learned, elaborating standards and guidance in the specific area and providing advice to United Nations entities in the field. It may also require, where possible, establishing deployable human and technical capacities to deliver operational support including, as appropriate, support to the development of national capacities. At the country level, roles and responsibilities will differ as senior leaders designate responsibilities based on in-country presence and capacity as well as host-country Government requests. In each context, field presences should be able to draw on designated expertise and capacities at Headquarters.

53. Progress to date varies considerably and has been linked to the availability of resources. In some cases, a single entity acts as a go-to source of knowledge, expertise and capacity and may host limited rapidly deployable capacities. This is

the case for the Mediation Support Unit and Electoral Assistance Division in the Department of Political Affairs; the United Nations Mine Action Service and the Police Division in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Rapid Response roster.

54. The "cluster approach" is seeking to strengthen the predictability and coherence of humanitarian response by establishing global leads in specific areas: agriculture, camp coordination/management, early recovery, education, emergency shelter, emergency telecommunications, health, logistics, nutrition, protection, and water, sanitation and hygiene. Cross-cutting issues such as gender, human rights and the environment are also represented by specific technical focal points. This approach encourages United Nations agencies, funds and programmes to invest in building their own response capacities in the area they support, as well as to identify gaps in knowledge and capacity in the sector as a whole and to build capacity with partners at both global and national levels to be able to fill these gaps. This facilitates a more coherent and transparent system with which Governments, donors, and external partners can engage. Capacities and mechanisms put in place during the humanitarian crisis can provide a basis to quickly support the development of national capacities and delivery of basic services in the early post-conflict phase.

55. In operational areas where multiple United Nations actors are involved and diverse technical capacities are required, such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, rule of law and security sector reform, emphasis has been placed on identifying the specific contribution of each actor, jointly identifying common standards and guidance through dedicated inter-agency frameworks, and establishing arrangements for coordinated delivery in the field. On the basis of lessons learned to date, the challenge we face in these complex areas is to ensure coherence at Headquarters and in the field, avoid gaps where no single entity is responsible, and deliver in those areas where responsibilities are set out.

56. In some of the priority areas, the United Nations currently has relatively limited capacity and looks to external partners to provide additional expertise, knowledge and operational resources. Developing national capacities for public administration, for example, is an area where UNDP is present and active at the national and subnational level, including during the immediate aftermath of conflict, albeit with limited resources. The Department of Economic and Social Affairs has important research and analytical capacity. The World Bank has a critical mass of expertise in the provision of public sector management support at the national level. In some critical areas for immediate post-conflict action, such as public finance and basic monetary and fiscal policy, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, respectively, are the main source of international knowledge, expertise and capacity. There is potential for the United Nations and external partners to increase their collaboration further in order to make full use of their respective strengths.

57. We will continue to work towards greater levels of clarity, predictability and accountability across all priority areas identified in the present report. *In order to strengthen the Secretariat-based institutional arrangements already in place in a number of these areas, I will ensure that they are reviewed at the most senior level on a regular basis. These reviews will assess progress against defined and agreed benchmarks, particularly the extent to which the arrangements have resulted in faster and more effective results on the ground, and determine appropriate follow-up action.*

58. There are a number of recurring priority areas where further clarity and predictability are needed, both within the United Nations system and among key partners. We will work with the relevant United Nations entities and partners, including the World Bank and regional organizations, to improve our collective performance in these areas. Based on in-depth discussions with many of these entities in preparation of the present report, we intend to focus on the following areas where we want to make significant progress in the coming months:

- Public administration, in particular immediate support to key government institutions to enable them to administer and manage core government functions from the outset
- Transitional governance arrangements, including constitutional processes
- The reintegration of returnees
- Early employment generation
- Other aspects of economic revitalization
- The rehabilitation of basic infrastructure.

59. As we have seen in a number of other recurring priority areas, a core of standing United Nations capacities can be essential to a predictable and effective international response. Based on the upcoming discussions regarding the areas listed above, we may present requests for additional resources for standing capacities or other arrangements that would improve the international response in critical areas. Some of these capacities may have to be funded from the regular or assessed budget. Others may have to come from extrabudgetary resources and should become part of the core funding for the relevant agencies, funds and programmes.

Predictable international support: Fielding United Nations and other international civilian capacities

60. Ensuring a rapid and effective response in countries devastated by conflict requires augmenting the existing capacity on the ground and deploying additional international civilian capacity in areas such as the rapid restoration of agricultural production or effective management of natural resources. While the United Nations is an important source of such capacity or a conduit for it, Member States and regional and subregional organizations also provide important civilian capacity. The challenge is to ensure that these efforts are complementary and are deployed to meet country demand, rather than on the basis of existing supply.

61. The need for rapid deployment should not outweigh careful consideration as to how to draw on capacities that are already on the ground, both national and international. There is almost always international capacity on the ground as conflict ends and, in some cases, humanitarian actors and assets are the only international actors present beyond a national capital. These operational capacities can be critical to support the quick delivery of basic services, particularly as people begin to return. Mechanisms to rapidly reinforce these existing capacities, including through agencies' own surge capacities and rosters, are an essential element of a post-conflict response. In particular, where humanitarian actors are engaged in activities that coincide with immediate peacebuilding priorities, the fastest way to scale up those activities is to augment the capacities and resources of these humanitarian actors.

62. Predictable delivery of international support can only be assured if operational capacities and resources are in place. The precise form of these capacities differs from issue to issue. Where requirements are urgent, and given the significant challenges to rapidly identifying and deploying appropriate civilian expertise, it is most time-efficient to rely on standing and standby civilian capacities maintained by entities across the United Nations system, by international financial institutions, and by external partners.

63. Standing capacities are the most immediate capacities we can draw upon. Within the United Nations, they constitute experienced staff whose conditions of service require that they deploy rapidly to meet urgent operational requirements, and can support urgent capacity development needs until regular recruitment is finalized. These individuals are hired under conditions of service established by their organization and are deployed at critical points to underpin the integrated efforts of the United Nations system on the ground. We have learned that standing capacities can play a critical role in the early planning and start-up phases of a mission, thereby ensuring a seamless transition from the planning to the implementation stages. And using existing capacities can accelerate the delivery of peace dividends. The Mediation Support Unit's Standby Team and the Standing Police Capacity have received high praise for their work in mediation and mission start-up, respectively. *I recommend that we build on the successful experience with the Standing Police Capacity to ensure, from the outset, a holistic and coordinated approach to strengthening rule of law that results in the equally rapid deployment of justice and corrections capacities. I intend to provide further details in this regard, taking into account the relevant provisions of General Assembly resolutions 61/279 and 63/250.* Other multilateral actors, including the European Union and the World Bank, have established or are developing arrangements for quick deployment of civilian experts, which could complement United Nations standing capacities.

64. Standby capacities include rosters of pre-vetted candidates able and ready to deploy rapidly to serve as staff members of a United Nations mission or under engagement with other United Nations organizations, international financial institutions, non-governmental organizations or external partners. They also include mediation and other capacities held "on retainer" as well as Member States' capacities ready to be activated rapidly when needed. Rosters of experts are a necessary tool for the rapid deployment of civilian capabilities. However, experience has shown that roster maintenance requires significant investment, particularly to ensure depth, range and diversity of expertise, notably from the Global South. Moreover, expert-level rosters are rarely interoperable or coordinated and there is no single point for national and United Nations actors to transmit requests or obtain information on what resources are available. *The United Nations Secretariat will work with roster leads to facilitate the development of common standards, training, and guiding principles to enhance the interoperability across expert rosters within each of the typical priority areas.*

65. Rapidly deployable standing and standby capacities complement but do not replace the need for efficient recruitment processes and human resources management. Within the United Nations system, we have a rich resource of personnel with diverse backgrounds, skills, knowledge and experience from many different contexts. However, our own procedures inhibit mobility of staff across the system. We need to be able to draw on this staff much more readily. *I urge Member*

States to approve the remaining parts of my human resources reform package to harmonize the conditions of service so that through inter-agency mobility with compatible remuneration and benefits packages, the United Nations can utilize and build its community of post-conflict practitioners and occupational experts and foster greater cross-fertilization among the relevant United Nations entities.

66. International support to initial peacebuilding efforts can benefit from the contribution of personnel from neighbouring regions, from countries with a similar socio-economic, cultural or linguistic composition, or from countries that have undergone a post-conflict transition. With its global reach and country presences in the Global South, the United Nations should be able to better leverage such capacities to support peacebuilding efforts. *I am directing United Nations recruitment efforts to establish new outreach to appropriately qualified personnel from the Global South. I am also directing United Nations field presences to identify qualified national staff for rostering and potential selection for work in post-conflict situations.*

67. The United Nations Volunteers (UNV) Programme offers valuable support to the provision of civilian capacities in post-conflict environments in a broad range of occupational areas, drawing particularly from neighbouring countries. Built on the principle of volunteerism, the UNV Programme currently deploys individuals in over 140 countries in support of United Nations peace and development activities. *I encourage UNV, in cooperation with relevant United Nations entities, to prioritize the identification of civilian capacity in the recurring priority areas, and to explore the establishment of a special programme for the deployment of United Nations Volunteers with relevant expertise and experience for short-term field service as peacebuilding volunteers.*

68. Beyond the United Nations, considerable efforts have been made internationally to expand civilian capacities but primarily within a small number of western donor countries. Too often, these efforts have been undertaken with little attention to one another; with inadequate linkages to multilateral systems, through which the bulk of post-conflict response is undertaken; and with insufficient attention to the question of mobilizing capacity in the Global South and among women. *A review needs to be undertaken that would analyse how the United Nations and the international community can help to broaden and deepen the pool of civilian experts to support the immediate capacity development needs of countries emerging from conflict, focusing particularly on the priority areas identified in the present report. To take this forward, I intend to have further discussions with Member States.* This review could take stock of the capacities that exist or can be generated within the United Nations, as well as those that exist within regional organizations and Member States, and map these against potential demand. It could look at how we can strengthen and improve interoperability between multilateral institutions, regional organizations and Member State capacities, giving particular attention to mobilizing capacity in the Global South, as well as the potential for developing partnerships.

69. The international community has repeatedly recognized the contribution that civilian experts from the Global South can bring, but investment in building such capacities, to date, has fallen far short. Some valuable steps are being made in Africa, including the establishment of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, the establishment of the African Civilian Standby Roster for

Humanitarian and Peacebuilding Missions, and the recent opening of the Cairo Regional Centre for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa. Similar steps have been taken in south-east Asia with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum, and in the Pacific through the Political and Security Programme of the Pacific Islands Forum. Efforts to build regional crisis management capacity in Africa and other regions need to be further supported and strengthened in order to address civilian expert capacities in a more systematic way.

70. Regional and subregional organizations have an important role to play in developing civilian capacities for deployment to post-conflict countries. The United Nations regional economic commissions also have an important role to play in facilitating outreach to qualified individuals and in supporting regional organizations to enhance their crisis management capacities. *I call upon Member States to invest the necessary resources, as well as to support regional organizations, in their efforts to mobilize civilian experts in countries from the Global South, in particular women.*

Engagement with the World Bank

71. Close collaboration between the United Nations and the World Bank is critical to an effective multilateral response and can provide a platform to support the engagement of other international actors. Recognizing the need for a strong strategic partnership, the President of the World Bank and I signed a Partnership Framework Agreement in October 2008, to strengthen cooperation between our organizations in crisis and post-crisis contexts and thereby contribute to a more effective and sustainable international response. *Building on this Agreement, the United Nations and the World Bank Group will establish a specific mechanism for regular headquarters-level consultations on crisis and post-crisis countries of common concern. The goal of this consultation mechanism will be to improve the strategic coordination and the collective impact of United Nations and World Bank efforts.*

72. The World Bank has a strong technical capacity in several of the recurring priority areas, which provides an important complement to the United Nations strengths. *In specific post-conflict situations, the senior United Nations leadership should call upon World Bank country directors and managers for early engagement and rapid technical advice, as appropriate, in priority areas where the Bank has a clear comparative advantage.*

Financing

73. Effective leadership, common strategy, and more predictable support capacity will amount to very little without rapid financial resources. Funding during the humanitarian phase comes in quickly, using special procedures designed for fast release. Funding for peacebuilding is usually drawn from development budgets, which typically have long lead times from inception to disbursement at the country level. The result is a funding gap between the time humanitarian funding starts to diminish and development funding starts to flow. The challenge is to close the gap from both sides, maintaining adequate levels of humanitarian financing in the period immediately after conflict, but also pre-positioning some funding for immediate and catalytic activities, and bringing development funds in earlier. We also need to ensure that mechanisms used to do this are suited to the fluid and volatile nature of early post-conflict environments, and that they enable funds to come in behind a coherent strategy.

74. Immediately after conflict, humanitarian assistance will still be required. In fact, humanitarian needs can sometimes increase as access to affected areas opens and displaced populations begin returning home. During the conflict period, there will be pockets of peace where, in addition to direct "life-saving" interventions, peoples' lives can be greatly improved through transitional safety nets that protect human assets, investments in livelihood opportunities, semi-permanent shelter, road access, and strengthened local governance. These activities are included in the early recovery component of the humanitarian response. They provide important investments in national capacities that help to provide the foundation for a faster response once the conflict ends. **I urge donors to fully fund these important early recovery activities, and continue supporting essential humanitarian assistance in the conflict and post-conflict period.**

75. At the multilateral level, several Funds have been established to pre-position resources for rapid and early disbursement. In addition to its role in the countries on the Peacebuilding Commission's agenda, the Peacebuilding Fund could be used in two ways to catalyse early priorities and to bridge the funding gap between donor pledges and funding disbursements. In the immediate aftermath of conflict, a first quick release of funds could be requested by the senior United Nations official in the country, working closely with national authorities, to catalyse concrete activities identified in an early integrated strategic framework, or its equivalent. A second more significant allotment could be made available once a national peace consolidation and recovery framework has been established, to catalyse the urgent activities identified therein and help to bridge delays in donor disbursements. *I have suggested in my report on the Peacebuilding Fund to the General Assembly (A/63/818) that the terms of reference for the Fund should be revised to accommodate both a flexible and early release of funds for critical peacebuilding needs and a second catalytic release as other resources are mobilized. I will take steps to strengthen the catalytic focus of the Peacebuilding Fund on core peacebuilding priorities and ensure the right timing and focus of Peacebuilding Fund funding.*

76. Several other fast-disbursing mechanisms, such as the World Bank State- and Peace-Building Fund, the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery Trust Fund, and the European Commission Instrument for Stability have been designed to support peacebuilding activities while more comprehensive funding becomes available. The WFP Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation funding instrument was also specifically introduced and designed to address the transition funding gap. Complementarity between these instruments and the Peacebuilding Fund is essential to ensure that the Fund can fulfil its catalytic function.

77. The Peacebuilding Fund and other fast-disbursing pre-positioned funds will not be sufficient to close the gap. Additional country-specific funds need to come in earlier to support peacebuilding priorities in the first days and months. But, existing funding mechanisms are not suited to early post-conflict situations, which require a considerable degree of speed, flexibility and risk tolerance. I look forward to an early outcome from the ongoing efforts of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development-Development Assistance Committee to revise donor procedures so as to allow earlier and faster release of funds in post-conflict situations with a higher tolerance of risk. Transparency in international assistance is also essential to foster confidence in the peace process and enable greater accountability to beneficiaries and national stakeholders. **I urge donors to be bold**

and innovative in finding solutions that will establish flexible, rapid and predictable funding modalities for countries emerging from conflict. Funding should be adequate and commensurate with pledges made, and should be made available in a timely manner to close funding gaps, including for early recovery, and avoid duplication. Funding should also be aligned behind the limited set of priorities identified through common assessment and planning processes to ensure that financial incentives drive all actors in the same direction. Given the persistence of this issue, it is time that Member States take the necessary action to address the shortcomings in funding practices that they have identified. *I will ask the Chair of the United Nations Development Group, working closely with the Peacebuilding Support Office, to engage in this process and to ensure that the United Nations and other key multilateral partners provide the necessary support to bring this discussion to a rapid and satisfactory conclusion.*

78. The early establishment of country-level multi-donor trust funds and other pooled funding mechanisms can reduce the risk for each individual donor while increasing the predictability of funding for national authorities. Evidence has shown that when resources are channelled through such funds, they can contribute significantly to predictability and coherence and facilitate alignment by directing funds towards a focused set of agreed priorities. If well-supported, multi-donor trust funds and other pooled funds can be the muscle behind a common strategic approach. In the past, such funds were plagued by administrative and legal obstacles that diminished their effectiveness considerably. Within the United Nations-World Bank Partnership framework agreement, we have addressed the management of multi-donor trust funds to reduce the obstacles inhibiting their fast and smooth operation. *In addition to calling upon donors to fully fund ongoing operations through existing mechanisms, I will encourage the establishment of in country multi-donor trust funds and other pooled funding mechanisms in countries emerging from conflict, as appropriate. I encourage donors to make use of these mechanisms to the fullest possible extent.*

79. Funding for women's early recovery needs is vital to increase women's empowerment and correct historical gender imbalances, as well as the deficit in funding for women's and girls' needs. Neglect of women's needs for physical security, income control and access to decision-making can impose serious costs. *Early funds for women's organizations and networks can empower female voices in the evolving peace process. I will ensure that United Nations-managed funds and in particular the United Nations Development Group Multi-Donor Trust Funds will pilot a system pioneered by UNDP to allow decision-makers to track gender-related allocations.*

VI. Role of the Peacebuilding Commission

80. The establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission in late 2005, through Security Council resolution 1645 (2005) and General Assembly resolution 60/180, represented a major milestone in the evolution of the international community's response to peacebuilding. The Commission combines a close link to three principal organs of the United Nations (the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council) with a unique membership that brings together not only seven members of each of these organs, but also the top providers of assessed and voluntary contributions, and of military personnel and civilian police to United

Nations missions. In the presidential statement of 20 May 2008 by which the Security Council requested the present report, the Council welcomed the work of the Peacebuilding Commission in advising on the coordination of international peacebuilding activities and resources, and expressed its support for enhancing the role of the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund.

81. In the less than four years of its existence, the engagement of the Peacebuilding Commission with the countries on its agenda has continued to evolve. While it is still early to draw conclusions from the limited country engagement, Sierra Leone and Burundi offer useful lessons that can be applied in other countries. At the same time, Peacebuilding Commission deliberations have identified a need to further adapt its mechanisms and working methods to strengthen its contributions to the overall peacebuilding effort.

82. The Peacebuilding Commission has a critical role to play in championing and promoting the agenda outlined in the present report. After the main conflict in a country ends, many of the critical peacebuilding tasks have to be initiated. This also means that the role of the Peacebuilding Commission extends to the critical period immediately after conflict covered by the report. Several of the main purposes of the Commission, as defined in paragraph 2 of its founding resolutions, are highly relevant during this period. As the founding resolutions also underline, the main purpose of the Commission in post-conflict situations on the agenda of the Security Council (in particular where there is a United Nations-mandated peacekeeping operation on the ground) is to provide advice to the Council at its request. *The Security Council should consider more proactively how the advice of the Commission could contribute to its work during the early phase of the Council's consideration of post-conflict situations, for example, by providing an integrated peacebuilding perspective and specific suggestions for the Council's own engagement with the country on its agenda.* For countries on the Security Council's agenda, the respective roles of the Council and the Commission need to be seen as complementary and in parallel, as envisaged by the founding resolutions, rather than sequenced in a manner that would diminish the Commission's role during earlier phases where it could add significant value.

83. *The Peacebuilding Commission may also wish to consider how it could further enhance its advisory role in relation to countries on its agenda and a number of areas covered in the present report, such as:*

- (a) *Focusing and sustaining attention to specific peacebuilding priorities;*
- (b) *Encouraging relevant actors to channel appropriate and timely human and financial resources for developing national capacities and institutions in critical priority areas;*
- (c) *Monitoring progress in the implementation of national peacebuilding strategies and recovery frameworks developed through common assessment and planning processes among national and international actors, and providing political support as necessary;*
- (d) *Promoting greater coherence and synergies between the different parts of the United Nations system and other relevant actors outside the United Nations system.*

84. *Building on ongoing discussions in the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council on financing for development, the Peacebuilding Commission may also wish to work with these two organs to encourage discussion of aid effectiveness and mutual accountability with a specific emphasis on the funding challenges that arise as conflict ends. More specifically, the Commission could:*

(a) Promote innovative approaches to mobilizing resources for peacebuilding, especially for countries that receive inadequate attention and funding;

(b) Advance aid effectiveness and mutual accountability between donors and programme countries around national peacebuilding compacts and priorities;

(c) Encourage donors to provide faster, more flexible and more risk-tolerant funding to address the specific funding challenges and gaps that arise when conflict ends.

85. I also look forward in 2010 to the review of arrangements set out in the founding resolutions of the Peacebuilding Commission by the General Assembly and the Security Council. In preparation for this review, I welcome the efforts of the Peacebuilding Commission, with the support of the Peacebuilding Support Office, to assess its current working methods and tools and propose more innovative and flexible approaches to how it can best engage and provide advice in post-conflict situations. This could range from more in-depth engagement, as has been the case so far, to lighter and more focused attention to specific priority issues where the Commission can add value in ways that other mechanisms cannot. In all cases, the Commission should build on and enhance existing country-level strategy-setting processes where they exist, and ensure that its work is closely linked to and driven by the specific needs and priorities of the country on its agenda. The unique membership and flexible configurations of the Commission should be considered as important factors in these deliberations as well.

86. More generally, I anticipate that the review in 2010 will provide Member States, particularly the members of the Commission, with an opportunity to deepen their own engagement with the Commission and to take greater ownership of its agenda and the advice it provides. The Commission can only succeed if all of its members come together to maximize its potential. They can ensure that the Commission plays a key role in supporting countries to achieve sustainable peace and development, and ultimately move beyond the stage where some of them require large peacekeeping missions. As the present report has made clear, however, this engagement needs to start early and it has to be focused on the key priorities that will ultimately allow for this transition to occur.

VII. Conclusions and observations

87. The challenges addressed in the present report are not new. For over a decade we have been grappling with how to bring peacebuilding upstream and mount a more rapid and effective response in the immediate aftermath of conflict. However, at this time of global resource constraints, when the most vulnerable bear the brunt of economic downturn, there is a new urgency to redouble our efforts and ensure that resources are used more efficiently by promoting a more coherent, effective and focused response.

88. In the present report, I have focused on the first two years after conflict because this period presents particular challenges and persistent gaps, but also considerable opportunities. By meeting people's demands for security, shoring up the political process, delivering a peace dividend and strengthening national capacity, we can help national actors in their efforts to set positive dynamics in motion right from the start. I must underscore the importance of an early emphasis on strengthening national capacity, ensuring it is part of an entry strategy, and not merely as the basis for exit.

89. Given the imperative of national ownership and the fluidity of post-conflict contexts, peacebuilding efforts must be anchored at the country level. While the support and guidance from the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Peacebuilding Commission, United Nations Headquarters and Member State capitals is essential, it is largely the leaders on the ground, both national and international, who can ensure that vision, strategy and decision-making respond effectively to the realities of an ever-changing situation.

90. The United Nations is increasingly expected to play a leadership role in the field, facilitating engagement between national and international actors, and among international actors. I have set out an agenda to strengthen the United Nations contribution to a more rapid and effective response in the immediate aftermath of conflict. The elements of this agenda include, strengthening and supporting leadership teams in the field, promoting earlier strategic coherence, strengthening national capacity from the outset, improving our ability to provide rapid and predictable capacities, and enhancing the speed, flexibility, amount and risk tolerance of post-conflict financing. Each element reinforces the others. To be successful, we need to implement the full agenda.

91. The United Nations will always be one among many actors involved in efforts to support countries emerging from war and therefore relies on strong partnerships based on clear comparative advantage. The World Bank is a critical strategic partner in the initial post-conflict period. I am committed to deepening our relationship and ensuring that it can be operationalized to leverage our respective strengths. Regional and subregional organizations also have vital political, security and economic roles to play in the immediate aftermath of conflict. We must build on our nascent partnerships in the peacemaking, peacekeeping and development spheres to promote the engagement of regional and subregional organizations in peacebuilding.

92. Implementing this agenda would be a critical step forward in improving international support for countries emerging from conflict. This agenda represents the beginning rather than the end of a process. I am eager to take these steps forward within the United Nations system. I look to Member States as key partners without whose support this agenda cannot be realized.

93. The successful implementation of this agenda requires that certain fundamental political conditions are in place. A basic level of political will and commitment on the part of national actors is a precondition for peacebuilding. A regional environment conducive to transforming conflict dynamics into peaceful political and economic conditions is essential. International support is also fundamental and requires that Member States align their assistance and engagement in support of a coherent and sustained effort. Unless these basic political conditions are in place, the ability of the Organization to promote a coherent and effective response will be limited.

94. There are no quick fixes for holding and sustaining peace. National actors face enormous political, security and development challenges after conflict. But if the international community, led by the United Nations system, is ready to respond rapidly, coherently and effectively, we can help to give national actors a greater chance of sustaining peace and laying the foundations for sustainable development. All too often it is innocent men, women and children who pay the price of war. We cannot ask them to pay the price of peace.